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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KANE, STATE OF UTAH 
MARC SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO.; 
MARTIN MATHIS; MICHAEL DENOYER; 
RONALD R. SMITH; DONALD 
SAUNDERS, JOHN DOES 1 through 
5 and JANE DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
Civil NO. 940600003 
(Condensed Transcript) 
* * * 
DEPOSITION OF: LINDA RAE HOLLANDER 
TAKEN ON: May 21, 1997 
PAUL G. MCMULLIN 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER 
PO BOX 1534 
ST GEORGE, UTAH 84771 
(801)674-1283 2079 
LINDA RAE KOLLANDER 
26 
1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Did that also decrease over time? That is, her 
3 visits to the office? 
4 A. Yes. 
5 Q. Did the tension between Marc and Ron continue 
6 after the sale? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 Q. Would you characterize it as getting worse, 
9 better or about the same? 
10 A. I would say probably a little worse. 
11 Q. Okay. And how was it that this worsening of the 
12 tension manifested itself to you? What things did you 
13 notice -
14 A. Ron started coming into the office less. When 
15 he did come in, Ron - Marc would either - he would get up 
16 and leave. 
17 Q. Did it manifest itself in any other ways to you? 
18 A. Not that I'm aware of. 
19 Q. Okay. Did you attribute Ron coming into the 
20 office less to this poor relationship he had with his 
21 brother? 
22 A. Yes. 
23 Q. Between 1986 and 1992, when Marc left the employ 
24 of Grand Canyon, did you ever discuss with Marc his 
25 relationship with Ron? 
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1 A. Pardon? 
2 Q. Between 1986 and mid 1992 - July, 1992, when 
3 Marc was separated from the company, did you ever discuss 
4 with Marc the - this tension between himself and Ron? 
5 A. I donl recall discussing it with Marc. I may 
6 have. I donl recall it right ~ I may have. I don't 
7 really recall it. 
8 Q. Do you recall discussing it with Ron during that 
9 same time frame? 
10 A. Very - yes. 
11 Q. Okay. And what do you recall discussing with 
12 Ron in that connection? 
13 A. He still really didnl know why Marc was so 
14 upset with him. I think he felt like he had tried to talk 
15 to - to Marc and was unable to talk with him. 
16 Q. Was this something that Ron communicated to you 
17 in a personal conversation face-to-face? 
18 A. Yes. 
19 Q. Do you recall having more than one conversation 
20 with Mr. Smith about that? 
21 A. I think so. 
22 Q. Could you, as you sit here today, assign any 
23 time period to one or more of those conversations? In 
24 other words, it occurred in this year or that year? 
25 A. I cant say specifically what year. It was 
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1 after the sale of the company, probably in - in probably 
2 the first or second year. 
I 3 Q. Do you remember anything else about the 
4 substance of those conversations with Mr. Smith about the 
5 poor relationship he had with Marc Smith? 
I 6 A. It also caused a very poor relationship with the 
7 other - with his family, of course - with his brothers 
8 and sisters. K — it destroyed his family relationship 
9 with the rest of his family. 
10 Q. And why do you feel that way? 
11 A. It was because they felt that Ron had not 
12 treated Marc fairly, I guess, in the sale of the company. 
13 Q. Did you feel that Ron had not treated Marc 
14 fairly in - in terms of the sale of the company? 
15 A. I - he let everyone know he was selling the 
16 company. I can't say that - and I don't - and as far as 
17 I knew, there was no agreement between the two brothers 
18 as - that he would have part - you know, other than that 
19 he tried to make a place for him in the company when the 
20 company sold. 
21 Q. Okay. Was it your understanding that Ron Smith 
22 had tried to make a place for Marc in the new company? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. On what basis did you understand that? 
25 A. That he was going to be one of the partners in 
29 
1 the company. 
2 Q. All right. What understanding did you have as 
3 to Ron Smith's role in - in securing a place in the new 
4 company for Marc Smith? 
5 A. if it hadn't have been for Ron Smith doing it, 
6 it wouldn't have happened. 
7 Q. How do you know that? 
8 A. Because the other two members of it didn't 
9 really - really want a third member or a third partner. 
10 Q. And the other two members you're referring to 
11 would be Mr. DeNoyer and Mr. Mathis? 
12 A. That's correct. 
13 Q. And you said that the other two did not want a 
14 third partner, is that right? 
15 A. That's right. 
16 Q. Did you have any conversation with Mr. DeNoyer 
17 or Mr. Mathis when they indicated as much to you? 
18 A. I was sitting in the room when they discussed it 
19 right after the sale of the business. Marty was very 
20 disappointed. He did not want to have a third partner. 
21 And Michael just said, "We'll deal with it." 
122 Q. And this was in-at the end of 1986, after the 
23 business sold? 
24 A. Yes. Shortly thereafter. Just when the papers 
25 were being finalized. 
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D e p o s i t i o n of DONALD A. SAUNDERS, taken on beha l f of 
P l a i n t i f f , a t 920 Hildebrand Ln. N . E . , Bainbridge 
I s l a n d , Washington, on A p r i l 19 , 1997, commencing a t 
8:00 a .m. , be fore KELLY SOMMERVILLB, R e g i s t e r e d 
P r o f e s s i o n a l Reporter and Notary P u b l i c i n and for the 
S t a t e of Utah, pursuant to N o t i c e . 
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BY: BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR. 
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Salt Lake City, Utah, April 18, 1997, 8:00 a.m. 
DONALD A. SAUNDERS, 
was duly sworn, was examined and 
* testified as follows: 
BY MR. HATHAWAY: 
Q. Don, would you state and spell your full name 
for the record for us? 
A. Donald, D-o-n-a-l-d, Arthur, A-r-t-h-u-r 
Saunders, S-a-u-n-d-e-r-s. 
Q. What's your address? 
A. 5261 Battle Point Drive NE, Bainbridge Island, 
Washington 98110. 
Q. How long now have you lived on Bainbridge 
Island? 
A. Year and-a-half. 
Q. Do you still have a residence in Arlington, 
Washington? 
A. No. 
Q. Sold that place? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What is your birth date? 
A. 7/25/34. 
Q. Give me an idea if you would, Don, as to your 
educational background. 
A. I graduated from Lake Washington High School 
Page 5 
and then I did about 200 credit hours at University of 
Washington but I didn't technically graduate in 
accounting. I took a lot of accounting courses and 
various other courses that I felt would further my 
accounting background. I was in public accounting 
business at the time, but I didn't need a certificate 
because I was in business with my father. 
Q. What did your father do? 
A. He was a public accountant. 
Q. So you were working with him doing those types 
of things? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When was it that you finished any formal 
education at University of Washington? 
A. Probably the last regular course, see, I've 
taken courses there. I guess I don't know what you mean 
by formal. I kept taking courses off and on for, you 
know, where they had seminars and different things like 
that for years. 
Q. Did you? 
A. 20 years, yeah. 
Q. Yeah. 
A. And other places, you know, that I did some. 
Q. Have you ever received any certificates? 
A. No. 
INTERMOUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS*263-1396 Page 2 - Page 5 
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1 Q. No graduation diploma? 
2 A. From the university? 
3 Q. Right. 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. And you're not a C.P.A.? 
6 A. No. 
7 Q. Were you born in Washington? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Whereabouts? 
10 A. Seattle. 
11 Q. Lived here all your life? 
12 A. Yes, uh-huh, lived in the state of Washington 
13 all my life. 
14 Q. Tell me if you would, Don, briefly about your 
15 employment background starting from this point in time 
16 when you were employed with your father. 
17 A. I worked for my father for a few years, then as 
18 a partner with my father for a few years, and then my 
19 father retired and I ran the practice for a couple 
20 years, and then I sold the practice and became the 
21 financial officer for a boat building company. 
22 Q. That was Bayliner Boats as I understand it? 
23 A. Yes, uh-huh. 
24 Q. When did you sell the practice? 
25 A. In about September of '72. 
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1 Q. How many employees were there at Saunders 
2 Accounting and Bookkeeping at the time you sold it? 
3 A. Five. 
4 Q. Why don't you describe for us what you did 
5 after going to work for Bayliner as the chief financial 
6 officer. 
7 A. When I went to work for Bayliner, I handled all 
8 of the financial matters, the trucking department, the 
9 -- all the computer operations, the health, accident, 
10 all those types of things, all the employee benefit 
11 programs. All of the hiring policies and hiring of all 
12 the people were in my departments. I used to say it was 
13 everything the other guys didn't want to do actually 
14 there, but anyway, those types of things. I got 
15 involved in manufacturing from time to time and in 
16 the — somewhat in the design of the boats, pretty much 
17 the whole thing. 
18 Eventually, by 1976 there was the Five people who 
19 eventually were the owners of the company, myself and 
20 three other guys. We had lunch together every day and 
21 we, between the four of us, we pretty much basically ran 
22 the company under us because we were -- if everybody was 
23 in town eating lunch together every day, we got involved 
24 in each other's parts of the business. So I was 
25 involved in everything, but primarily the parts I named. 
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1 Q. What was the practice known as at the time you 
2 sold it? 
3 A. Saunders Accounting and Bookkeeping. 
4 Q. During your work with Saunders Accounting and 
5 Bookkeeping, was Bayliner one of your customers, 
6 clients? 
7 A. Well, maybe we better distinguish on Bayliner. 
8 It started out as Puget Advanced Outboard Marine, 
9 Advanced Outboard went to Advanced Outboard Marine, went 
10 to Puget Plastics, went to some different names but 
11 for - we could just for simplicity purposes say 
12 Bayliner. Bayliner was the name of the boats the 
13 company built. 
14 Q. I understand. 
15 A. And so it's commonly known as that. The 
16 corporate names were different things as well through 
17 the years. 
18 Q. What was the corporate name at the time you 
19 became involved as the chief financial officer? 
20 A. By then it was Bayliner Marine. 
21 Q. And that was about in 1972? 
22 A. '72, yes. I had for a number of years before 
23 that done all our accounting and our office had done all 
24 the payrolls and payables and everything for what was to 
25 become eventually Bayliner Marine. 
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1 Q. When did you become an owner in this entity 
2 that became Bayliner Boats? 
3 A. When I sold my accounting practice. The owner, 
4 the person at that time that basically owned the whole 
5 thing, Orin Edson, said he was going to have to get a 
6 financial officer to come in and work in the company if 
7 I wouldn't sell my accounting practice and go to work 
8 for him. And so I made him a deal where he'd sell me 
9 part of the company if I sold the accounting practice 
10 and go to work for him simply because I was a little 
11 bored with the accounting. It's the same old thing 
12 every day. Bayliner was exciting and it was growing., I 
13 knew I was taking a pretty good risk, but I just was 
14 really impressed with it because my accounting practice, 
15 the year I sold it, which brought it to a head was I had 
16 taken two months off my practice. I had about a hundred 
17 clients and it ran so smooth and was so good I'd just 
18 take the summer off and tour around the country with my 
19 kids. And while I was gone the two months they'd got in 
20 some problems with personnel and everything at Bayliner, 
21 so when I got back Orin says, Don, God, I've got to have 
22 you do that. That was one of my very wise decisions and 
23 I got rid of it. 
24 Q. What percentage did you buy? 
25 A. It varied and I bought more later. You know, I 
INTERMOUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS*263-1396 
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1 can't remember what percentage that was. Eventually I 
2 owned about four percent of Bayliner. 
.3 Q. Was Bayliner a publicly traded corporation? 
4 A. No. When we sold the company in 1986, there 
5 were four stockholders, two other people with the same 
6 stock as me and then a majority. Orin owned the 
7 majority. 
8 Q. Who were the four shareholders with you? 
9 A. Vinton Sommerville, David Livingston, and J. 
10 OrinEdson. 
11 Q. J. Orin Edson, and I take it from your prior 
12 statements that he was the primary -
13 A. Yes. 
14 Q. - shareholder? 
15 A. Yes. He'd started the original company which 
16 sold used outboards in Seattle. 
117 Q. And he sold to the Brunswick Corporation, 
118 correct? 
'19 A. We sold to the Brunswick. 
20 Q. I'm sorry, you sold. 
21 A. Uh-huh. 
22 Q. Brunswick, they still own Bayliner, don't they? 
23 A. Yes. And there was a number of names. It 
24 wasn't just Bayliner. Bayliner was the biggest 
25 product. We had other companies within it. We had 
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1 bought Chrysler Marine Corporation. You know, we had 
2 other boat companies that were - Blue Fin Aluminum 
3 Boats, things like that, but Bayliner basically, yes, 
4 that's what we sold. 
5 Q. Can you tell me what the other entities were 
6 that was part of that deal? 
7 A. I can't remember. There's lots of them. I'd 
8 have to go through the records and look. 
9 Q. But they were all included in your four percent 
10 ownership of the stock in this entity? 
11 A. Yes. They were all part of it. Originally 
12 there was, you know, back in the early '70s, the common 
13 thing was you keep a bunch of different corporations and 
14 eventually we'd put them all together because you didn't 
15 have any tax advantage and it got messy and everything 
16 was one corporation. So finally as we bought any other 
17 boat company we just took the assets and we didn't do 
18 the corporations and stuff. 
19 Q. Of the four shareholders of the company, who 
20 was most involved in these acquisitions and handling --
21 at least the way these other business entities or 
22 enterprises you described were handled and incorporated 
23 into the business? 
24 A. Orin Edson and I. If it was a large one, we'd 
25 generally negotiate it together because we'd play ping 
1 pong with the purchasers, you know. And then if it was, 
I 2 you know, not a major deal, you know, we're buying a 
3 200,000 square foot plant or something in Mississippi, I 
4 might go negotiate it myself or whatever. 
5 Q. Once you made the determination in this prior 
6 entity to acquire an asset or to acquire an enterprise, 
7 who was it that set up the actual structure, by the 
8 Bayliner group or Bayliner company for lack of a better 
9 name, to handle that new enterprise? 
10 A. I don't understand your question. 
II Q. Well, you testified that in the '70s 
12 everybody -- you used to set up the subsidiaries -
13 A. Uh-huh, right. 
14 Q. — for other corporations that were involved 
15 and ultimately there was no tax advantage to doing that 
16 so you brought all the businesses in? 
17 A. Sure, yep. 
18 Q. As these acquisitions were subsequently made, 
19 were they just purchased in the name of this Bayliner 
20 company? 
21 A. Yep, uh-huh. 
22 Q. Were any of the four or the three remaining 
23 shareholders involved at all with you directly in the 
24 aspects of the business you described, you were involved 
25 in primarily the accounting business? 
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1 A. To some extent. Again, we ate lunch together 
2 every day. 
3 Q. It was an oversight kind of function? 
4 A. Yeah. We'd talk about that and then we -
5 every Monday night we had a meeting for three or four 
6 hours and that also included — and the lunch included 
7 maybe three other key personalities. It would vary from 
8 one to four as time went on, but it involved other 
9 people. We were just together. I mean, we - and our 
10 offices were all in a row in the offices, you know, so 
11 we saw each other lots. 
12 Q. You talked on a regular basis? 
13 A. Yeah. 
14 Q. When you sold Baylienr in 1986, how many 
115 employees did Bayliner have? 
16 A. About 7,000. 
17 Q. How many employees would you consider at least 
18 as of 1986 when you sold the business to have been in a 
19 management sort of a position? 
20 A. In some type of management, do you consider a 
21 leadman, is he a management person? 
22 Q. That's a broad question. 
23 A. Yeah. 
24 Q. Were there other employees of the entity 
25 besides the four of you which you considered to be key 
$96 Page 10 - Page 1 • 
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1 personnel involved in the operation of the business? 
2 A. Many. 
.3 Q. Many? 
4 A. We had 7,000 employees. There was many, many, 
5 many. 
6 Q. Was there a core group of decision makers for 
7 the company besides the four of you? 
8 A. Yes. The other people that went to like lunch 
9 with us and met in our Monday night meeting were part of 
10 that core group. The guy that ran our marketing or I 
11 mean, actually our advertising department, 
12 communications we called it, the guy that was the 
13 bruntman as far as all the manufacturing operations. 
14 Oh, various other people. There was probably 30 key 
15 people. There was probably 30 people say in 1986 that 
16 earned more than 100,000 a year and those are fairly ~ 
117 at that time that would be like a quarter of a million 
18 today. Those were fairly key management people who 
[19 worked with us. 
120 Q. Was there ever a point in time that the four of 
21 you that owned and ultimately controlled the company had 
22 disagreements about how to handle certain aspects of the 
23 business? 
24 A. Yeah, occasionally, uh-huh. 
25 Q. Is it fair to say that that wasn't something 
_ _ 
1 that necessarily was uncommon? 
2 MR. ANDERSON: rll object to the question. That's 
3 overbroad. 
4 THE WITNESS: Well, actually it was - it was very 
5 uncommon in our company. 
6 BY MR. HATHAWAY: 
7 Q. How about within this group of 30 core people, 
8 was it — I take it that some of those may have been 
9 involved in generally the same aspect of the business? 
10 A. Yes, uh-huh. 
11 Q. In your experience with Bayiiner Corporation, 
12 isn't it true that on occasion disputes arise as to how 
13 to handle the operation of the business? 
14 A. Not that I can really call disputes. We paid 
15 our help extremely well. Probably our key people were 
16 getting twice as much as anybody else in the industry. 
17 We never had anybody stolen from us because everybody 
18 would think I can't pay this guy that kind of money, so 
19 we didn't have that kind of problem, so we had the very 
20 best. So we, I mean, it was rare that I can ever 
21 remember any disputes among the people. I mean, we had 
22 the best and they worked it out and they were 
23 reasonable. We didn't have that kind of problem. 
24 It's like you ask the question about Orin, Slim, and 
25 Dave and I getting at each other. I don't remember but 
INTERMOUNTAIN COURT REPORTERS*263-
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1 two times that we had over 18 years we really had any, 
2 you know, really dispute that I had to kind of mediate 
3 in the middle of you might say over that many years. So 
4 there wasn't a lot. We were -- our business was making 
5 money and we concentrated on that. We didn't have a lot 
6 of infighting in the company. We didn't have -- we were 
7 very untypical of a very large company, you know, or 
8 large company because we didn't have a bunch of 
9 politicking going on, and that's where you get all of 
10 this infighting, you know. We didn't have it. I mean, 
11 we paid our people well and we kept them real busy and 
12 it's like I always said, just run the office short of 
13 people so they don't have time to get their little 
14 political groups together. So we didn't have it. It 
15 was a really rare incidence. 
16 Q. What have you done professionally since 1986 
17 when you sold the business? 
18 A. Professionally, nothing. 
19 Q. Nothing. 
20 A. I have businesses that other people - I mean, 
21 it's like this, I don't get involved in them. I'm very 
22 careful to stay kind of distanced from anything because 
23 I don't want any involvement in my company. 
24 Q. Tell me if you would, Don, what businesses 
25 you've got going besides the Grand Canyon Expeditions? 
Page 17 
1 A. Let's see, right now, I believe I don't have 
2 any except a land development company and GCE. I have 
3 another corporation I guess it's got some land in it but 
4 it's not very active. My land development company has 
5 quite a bit. I have a son-in-law that runs that. 
6 Q. What's the name of that company? 
7 A. It's SK. Enterprises Company or it's Donald -
8 Don Saunders DBA. It's not a corporation. 
9 Q. And I take it you're not in any way involved in 
10 the management or operation of the business of the 
11 entity? 
12 A. I've been one time in the last few years just 
13 on one piece of property where they were having some 
14 problems selling it, and I got in with the guys that 
15 were buying it and negotiated the sale price. 
16 Q. What sort of development do they do? 
17 A. Vacant lands, 300 acre lots, 1000 acre lots, 
18 5000 acre lots, that kind of property. 
19 Q. Is this recreational property? 
20 A. Residential. 
21 Q. Residential, so estate-type lots? 
22 A. Yeah, uh-huh. 
23 Q. Whereabouts are they operating? 
24 A. Snohomish County in the state of Washington. 
25 Q. Maybe you better spell Snohomish. 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARC SMITH, 
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GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS 
CO.; MARTIN MATHIS; MICHAEL 
DENOYER; DONALD SAUNDERS; 
JOHN DOES 1 through 5; and JANE 
DOES 1 through 5, 
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Defendants Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. ("Grand Canyon" or the "Company"), 
Donald Saunders ("Saunders"), Michael Denoyer ("Denoyer"), and Martin Mathis ("Mathis") 
(collectively referred to as "Defendants") submit the following points and authorities in 
support of their motion for summary judgment. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Defendants previously moved for summary judgment on all claims for relief set forth 
in Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint. The court granted partial summary judgment to 
Defendants, dismissing the first claim for relief in its entirety and the second claim for relief in 
MAR 2 2 1999 ^ 
Stirba and Hathaway 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
(HEARING REQUESTED) 
(FILED UNDER SEAL) 
Civil No. 940600003 
Hon. K. L. Mclff 
SLCl-474812 33714-0001 
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attorney, Mr. Skeen, that Plaintiffs stock was being purchased and he would need to prepare a 
buy-out amount consistent with the Buy/Sell Agreement. IdL 
Denoyer and Mathis were completely unsophisticated in financial and accounting 
matters. They relied upon the accounting expertise of the Company's accountant Mr. Willis. 
Mr. Willis has attested that there was no manipulation of the books and records of Grand 
Canyon to create an artificially low buy-out amount for Plaintiff. ML 1 22. Moreover, this 
theory is seriously undermined by the fact that Plaintiff, in essence, dictated the timing of his 
departure.4 
Plaintiffs counsel also appears to be under the mistaken impression that Grand 
Canyon's investment in White Water mysteriously disappeared in the consolidated financial 
statement prepared by Mr. Willis. In fact, the investment appears in the asset column of White 
Water that is added to Grand Canyon's assets. Sfi£ Exs. "F", "G", and "H". Counsel's 
libelous suggestion that Grand Canyon engaged in income tax fraud through erasure is 
unsupported by any factual evidence and simply indicates the depths to which counsel will sink 
to manufacture an illusory issue of fact. S££ Plaintiffs counsel's letter to Court dated January 
18, 1999 (attached hereto as Exhibit "R"). 
Plaintiffs counsel has also misrepresented to the Court previously that Grand Canyon's 
financial condition was worse in July 1992 than at any point in the history of the Company. 
As noted at the last hearing, and confirmed through Mr. Willis' Affidavit and the data 
available to Plaintiffs counsel, Grand Canyon's position was significantly better in July 1992 
4
 The undisputed facts demonstrate that Plaintiff demanded that his employment 
difficulties with Grand Canyon be resolved during the 1992 rafting season, rather than thereafter 
as Denoyer and Grand Canyon would have preferred. Sfi£ Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment, filed October 30, 1998 (citing deposition testimony). 
SLCl-47481 2 33714-0001 2 4 
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NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN 
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE 
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL 
RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
James DISHINGER and Nancy Dishinger dba 
TCBY Yogurt, 
Plaintiffs, Appellants, and Cross-appellees, 
v. 
Jana POTTER dba Silver Queen Hotel, Defendant, 
Appellee, and 
Cross-appellant. 
No. 20000081-CA. 
June 28, 2001. 
Commercial tenants filed declaratory judgment 
action asking court to interpret lease provision 
regarding monthly rental rate. Landlord 
counterclaimed for breach of lease and unlawful 
detainer. After jury trial, the Third District Court, 
Coalville Department, Robert K. Hilder and Pat B. 
Brian, JJ., entered judgment for landlord in amount of 
$8,730. Tenants appealed, and landlord cross-
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Billings, J., held that: 
(1) jury's special verdict was not advisory, and thus 
trial court was bound by jury's findings; (2) accord and 
satisfaction precluded finding of unlawful detainer; (3) 
waiver provision in lease did not preclude rinding of 
accord and satisfaction; (4) landlord was entitled to 
administrative fees; (5) landlord was not entitled to late 
fees; and (6) remand was necessary to deteraiine 
prevailing party for purposes of attorney fees. 
Reversed and remanded 
Orme, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
[1] Appeal and Error <S=> 1078(1) 
30 — 
30XVI Review 
30XVI(K) Error Waived in Appellate Court 
30kl078 Failure to Urge Objections 
30kl078(l) In General. 
Tenants could raise issue of accord and satisfaction 
on appeal, even though issue was not raised in 
pleadings, as record showed that evidence regarding 
existence of accord and satisfaction was presented at 
Copyright (c) West Group 2002 
trial, jury was instructed on and made findings of fact 
that supported accord and satisfaction, and landlord had 
opportunity to prepare and meet issue. Rules CivProc., 
Rule 15(b). 
[2] Pleading <S=»427 
302 — 
302XVIII Waiver or Cure of Defects and 
Objections 
302k427 Objections to Evidence as Not Within 
Issues. 
If an issue is fully tried, a court may decide the issue 
and deem the pleadings amended even if the issue was 
not originally pleaded, and whether the pleadings may 
be deemed amended depends on whether the opposing 
party had a fair opportunity to prepare and meet the 
issue. 
[3] Appeal and Error <®=>498.1 
30 — 
30X Record 
30X(A) Matters to Be Shown 
30k498 Presentation and Reservation of 
Grounds of Review 
30k498.1 In General. 
Commercial tenants who appealed from jury's 
special verdict were not required to provide transcript 
of proceedings below or marshal evidence, as tenants 
were not challenging findings of fact but' trial court's 
application of law to jury's special verdict findings. 
[4] Declaratory Judgment <®=^ 369 
118A — 
118 AH1 Proceedings 
118AIII(F) Hearing and Determination 
118Ak369 Verdict and Findings. 
Jury's special verdict in declaratory judgment action 
brought by tenants against landlord was not advisory, 
and thus trial court was bound by jury's findings, as 
both parties pursued legal, not equitable claims, tenants 
demanded jury trial on claims, and trial court did not 
inform parties or jury that jury was merely advisory. 
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 49(a). 
[5] Trial <S^347 
388 — 
388IX Verdict 
388EX(B) Special Interrogatories and Findings 
388k346 Power of Jury to Find Specially 
388k347 Special Verdict. 
In the case of a special verdict, the jury only finds 
the facts, and the court applies the law thereto and 
renders the verdict. 
claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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[6] Accord and Satisfaction <©=» 10(1) 
8 — 
8k6 Part Payment 
8kl0 Disputed or Unliquidated Claims 
8kl0(l) In General. 
[See headnote text below] 
[6] Accord and Satisfaction <©==> 11 (2) 
8 — 
8k6 Part Payment 
8kll Conditioned on Acceptance as Payment in 
Full 
8k 11(2) Remittances on Condition. 
Accord and satisfaction was established in dispute 
between commercial tenant and landlord as to rental 
rate, and thus tenants were not in unlawful detainer, 
where jury found a good faith agreement over amount 
due under lease, payments tendered were made in full 
satisfaction of disputed rent, and landlord negotiated 
check, which contained notation that amount was for 
new base rent. 
[7] Accord and Satisfaction <®^ 1 
8 — 
8k 1 Nature and Requisites in General. 
To establish an accord and satisfaction, three 
elements must be present: (1) an unliquidated claim or 
a bona fide dispute over the amount due, (2) a payment 
offered as full settlement of the entire dispute, and (3) 
an acceptance of the payment as full settlement of the 
dispute. 
[8] Accord and Satisfaction <®^ > 10(1) 
8 — 
8k6 Part Payment 
8k 10 Disputed or Unliquidated Claims 
8kl0(l) In General. 
To satisfy the requirement that there be a good-faith 
disagreement over the amount due under the contract, 
as required to establish an accord and satisfaction, the 
disagreement need not be well-founded, so long as it is 
in good faith. 
[9] Contracts <©=> 15 
95 — 
951 Requisites and Validity 
951(B) Parties, Proposals, and Acceptance 
95k 15 Necessity of Assent. 
A condition precedent to the enforcement of any 
contract is that there be a meeting of the minds of the 
parties, which must be spelled out, either expressly or 
implicitly, with sufficient definiteness to be enforced. 
Copyright (c) West Group 2002 
[10] Trial <®^358 
388 — 
388IX Verdict 
388IX(B) Special Interrogatories and Findings 
388k358 Inconsistent Findings. 
Where a jury's special verdict findings support 
inconsistent legal claims, a court is not precluded from 
applying the law to those findings and entering 
judgment for a party on one theory, as a matter of law, 
which precludes judgment on another inconsistent legal 
theory. Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 49(a). 
[11] Accord and Satisfaction <S=»10(1) 
8 - ~ 
8k6 Part Payment 
8k 10 Disputed or Unliquidated Claims 
8kl0(l) In General. 
[See headnote text below] 
[11] Accord and Satisfaction <©==> 11 (2) 
8—-
8k6 Part Payment 
8k 11 Conditioned on Acceptance as Payment in 
Full 
8k 11 (2) Remittances on Condition. 
Waiver provision in commercial lease providing 
that acceptance of rent did not constitute waiver did not 
preclude finding of accord and satisfaction based on 
tenants' tender of check for disputed rent amount, as 
lease provision did not provide that acceptance of 
partial rent did not constitute accord and satisfaction, 
and landlord could not claim that check tendered by 
tenants was partial rent, as there was no agreement as 
to amount of rent upon expiration of lease. 
[12] Landlord and Tenant <8==>238 
233 — 
233 VIII Rent and Advances 
233 VIII(B) Actions 
233k238 Costs. 
Landlord was entitled to administrative fees 
*726259 in dispute with commercial tenant, despite 
jury's finding of accord and satisfaction with respect to 
rent due, where lease unambiguously provided that 
tenants would pay for all costs and fees association with 
supervising and administering common areas. 
[13] Landlord and Tenant <@ >^216 
233 — 
233 VIII Rent and Advances 
claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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233 Vm(A) Rights and Liabilities 
233k216 Penalties or Double Rent. 
Landlord was not entitled to late fees under lease 
provision based on tenant's alleged failure to pay rent, 
as there was accord and satisfaction as to rent due, and 
thus tenants were current on rent payments. 
[ 14] Appeal and Error <@=> 1177(5) 
30 — 
30XVII Determination and Disposition of Cause 
30XVQ(D) Reversal 
30k 1177 Necessity of New Trial 
30kl 177(5) Errors in Rulings and 
Instructions at Trial. 
Remand was necessary in dispute between landlord 
and commercial tenants to determine which party was 
entitled to attorney fees as prevailing party, where trial 
court's finding of unlawful detainer was reversed on 
appeal. 
Third District, Coalville Department. 
The Honorable Robert K. Hilder. 
The Honorable Pat B. Brian. 
Dwayne A. Vance and David B. Thompson, Park 
City, for Appellants. 
Robert M. Felton, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before Judges BILLINGS, ORME, and THORNE. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Judge: 
**1 f 1 Plaintiffs James and Nancy Dishinger dba 
TCBY Yogurt (the Dishingers) appeal the trial court's 
judgment finding them in unlawful detainer. Defendant 
Jana Potter dba Silver Queen Hotel (Potter) cross-
appeals the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on 
the meaning of "prevailing rate" and its failure to award 
her administrative, late, and attorney fees. We reverse 
and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
H 2 In May of 1990, Erik Ziskend entered into a 
commercial lease with Potter for premises located on 
Main Street in Park City, Utah. On May 31, 1994, 
Ziskend assigned the lease to the Dishingers. Potter 
consented to the assignment. The Dishingers operated 
a frozen yogurt shop on the premises. 
T[ 3 The lease provided for continuous three year 
options after expiration of the initial three year lease 
term. Under the terms of the lease, the Dishingers, as 
tenants, were required to notify Potter in writing of 
their desire to exercise the option 120 days prior to the 
expiration of the current lease term. The lease 
specified that the rental rate for an option period would 
be "adjusted upward, but not less than the current 
Minimum Monthly Rent being paid, to the then 
prevailing rental rate of similar buildings in the Main 
Street area of Park City, Utah." (FN1) 
f 4 On February 1, 1996, the Dishingers notified 
Potter in writing of their desire to exercise the lease 
renewal option. Thereafter, the following 
correspondence took place. On April 4, 1996, Potter 
advised the Dishingers that the prevailing rental rate of 
similar buildings on Main Street in Park City was $30 
per square foot and thus, pursuant to the lease, $30 per 
square foot ($2,425.00/month) would constitute the 
new base monthly rent. The Dishingers responded that, 
based on the appraisal they had performed, the 
prevailing rental rate of similar buildings was $19 per 
square foot ($1,535.83/month). 
^[5 At the commencement of the July 1, 1996 
renewal period, without an agreement as to what would 
constitute the base monthly rent, the Dishingers began 
paying rent in an amount reflecting their appraisal of 
$19 per square foot. They sent Potter a check for 
$1,976.92, clearly noting it was for "New Base Rent." 
On July 8, 1996, Potter sent the Dishingers a notice of 
default on the grounds that the Dishingers were 
$889.17 delinquent in their July rental payment. On 
July 13, 1996, Potter served the Dishingers with a 
notice to pay the remaining rent or quit. On July 15, 
1996, Potter negotiated the Dishinger's July 1 rent 
check. On the first of every month, from July 1996 
through June 1997, the Dishingers sent Potter a check 
for $2,137.11 (FN2) reflecting $19 per square foot in 
base monthly rent. Potter negotiated each of those 
checks. 
f 6 On August 8, 1996, the Dishingers filed a 
declaratory judgment action asking the trial court to 
interpret the lease provision regarding the monthly 
rental rate. Potter counter-claimed for breach of lease 
and unlawful detainer. 
**2 Tj 7 After a jury trial, the jury returned a 
special verdict answering a number of factual 
Copyright (c) West Group 2002 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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questions. In the special verdict the jury found there 
was a legitimate dispute as to the "then prevailing 
rental rate," that the Dishingers tendered payment to 
Potter in full satisfaction of the disputed amount based 
on their appraisal of $19, and that Potter accepted the 
rent payments after the July 13 notice to quit. The jury 
also found the "then prevailing rental rate" to be $25 
per square foot, and as such, Potter was entitled to 
recover the balance of base rent, totaling $8,730. 
^[8 The Dishingers filed a motion for entry of 
judgment based on the special verdict, arguing that the 
jury's special verdict established an accord and 
satisfaction, which fixed the base rental rate at $19 per 
square foot, and thus, they were current in monthly 
payments and Potter's unlawful detainer claim should 
be dismissed. The Dishingers also argued that a 
determination that they were in unlawful detainer of the 
premises was precluded because Potter accepted rental 
payments after serving the notice to quit, thus waiving 
forfeiture of the lease. 
<fl 9 The trial court, first Judge Brian, then Judge 
Hilder in an amended judgment, entered judgment for 
Potter. The trial court concluded that, based on the 
findings of the jury in its special verdict, it was "clear" 
that while Potter accepted payments after the notice to 
quit, the amount received "did not represent a full 
payment of base rent," and thus did not constitute an 
accord and satisfaction. Thus, the trial court concluded 
the Dishingers were in unlawful detainer and entered 
judgment in favor of Potter for $8,730, which was 
trebled to $26,190 pursuant to Utah Code §vnn. 
78-36-10 (1996). This appeal followed. 
f 10 On appeal, the Dishingers argue the trial court 
was precluded from detemiining they were in unlawful 
detainer because the jury's special verdict established 
an accord and satisfaction as a matter of law. 
Alternatively, the Dishingers argue that Potter affirmed 
the lease by accepting rent payments, thereby waiving 
forfeiture of the lease, and thus precluding a finding of 
unlawful detainer. 
H 11 Potter cross-appeals, arguing the trial court 
should have instructed the jury that the "then prevailing 
rental rate" meant market rate. Potter also argues the 
trial court erred by failing to award her administrative 
fees, late fees, and attorney fees as required by the 
lease. 
ANALYSIS 
Copyright (c) West Group 2002 
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I. Preliminary Issues 
f 12 In addition to the claims raised in her cross-
appeal, Potter asserts that the Dishingers failed to 
preserve their claims below, failed to provide a 
transcript of the proceedings and marshal the evidence, 
and cannot rely on the jury's special verdict because it 
was merely advisory. Before addressing the main 
substantive issues on appeal, we first address these 
threshold arguments. 
A. Preservation of Claims 
[1][2] 113 Potter first argues the Dishingers failed 
to preserve their claim of accord and satisfaction in 
accordance with Rule 24(a)(5)(A) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Rule 24(a)(5)(A) provides that 
"[t]he brief of the appellant shall contain ... citation to 
the record showing that the issue was preserved in the 
trial court." Utah R.App. P. 24(a)(5)(A). The 
Dishingers reference several places in the record to 
show that the issue of accord and satisfaction was 
preserved in the trial court. (FN3) Thus, Potter's 
argument that the Dishingers did not preserve the issue 
of accord and satisfaction is without merit. (FN4) 
B. Marshaling the Evidence 
**3 [3^114 Potter next argues the Dishingers 
needed to provide a transcript of the proceedings to 
allow meaningful review of the evidence, and have also 
failed to marshal the evidence. A transcript of the 
proceedings is not required because the Dishingers are 
relying on the jury's special verdict on appeal, not the 
evidence presented at tria See, e.g Pugh v. North 
Am. Warranty Servs., Inc. 2000 UT App 12rf 11, 1 
P.3d 570. Moreover, the marshaling requirement 
applies only when challenging findings of f See 
Moon v. Moon, 1999 UT App 12f 24, 973 P.2d 431. 
Clearly, the Dishingers are not challenging findings of 
fact. Rather, they are challenging the trial court's 
application of the law to the jury's special verdict 
findings and thus the Dishingers do not have the burden 
of marshaling the evidence. 
C. Advisory Jury Verdict 
[4] H 15 Relying oi Peirce v. Peirce 2000 UT 7, 
994 P.2d 193, Potter next argues that the jury's special 
verdict was merely advisory, and therefore the trial 
court was not bound by the jury's findings in the special 
verdict. Potter's reliance c Peirce is misplaced. In 
claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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Peirce, the issue before the court was "whether the jury 
served in an advisory capacity or whether [the] case 
was tried by a jury as a matter of ngl Id a1<f 12 
However, the plaintiff Peirc was seeking an 
equitable remedy See id "When a jury is used in an 
equity case, it acts in an advisory c* /Jity," 
(quoting Romrell v Zions First Nat'l Ban 611 P 2d 
392, 394 (Utah 1980) (quotation and citation 
omitted)), " 'unless both parties have clearly consented 
to accept a jury verdict' " Id at % 13 (quoting Romrell, 
611 P 2d at 394 see als Utah R Civ P 39(c) 
Because the parties did not clearly consent to accept a 
jury verdict, and the record indicated that the tnal court 
treated the jury as advisory, the court held that the jury 
served only m an advisory capacity and thus afforded 
no deference to its findings See id at ^ f 15 
^ 16 In the instant case, we are not dealing with an 
action in equity Both the Dishingers and Potter 
pursued legal claims, the Dishingers specifically 
demanded a jury tnal on those claims, and at no time 
did the tnal court inform the parties or the jury that the 
jury was merely advise (Goldberg v Jay 
Timmons & Assoc. 896 P 2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 
Ct App 1995) (stating, "if the tnal court had mtended 
to use an advisory jury, it should have notified the 
parties before the tnal began") Where, as here, the 
case is tned to a jury as a matter of nght, Rule 49(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits the tnal 
court to "require a jury to return only a special verdict 
in the form of a special wntten finding upon each issue 
of fact" UtahR Civ P 49(a) "The [tnal] court then 
applies the law to the facts as found and renders a 
verdict" Brigham v Moon Lake Elec Ass'r 24 Utah 
2d 292, 298, 470 P 2d 393, 397 (1970) (Ellett, J, 
further opinion) (commenting on Rule 49(a)) 
**4 |^| 17 As Justice Ellett explamed m 
Brigham. 
The special verdict was devised to relieve the jury 
of attempting to apply the law m a complicated case 
to the facts m amving at a verdict Instructions to 
the jury are thus simplified, and the jurors may, 
therefore, concentrate upon the functions which 
belong to them, viz, to find the facts in the case 
Id Thus, "[i]n [the] case of a special verdict, the 
jury only finds the facts, and the court applies the law 
thereto and renders the veidn /< This is what 
occurred m the instant case The tnal court instructed 
the jury "[I]t is yoi exclusive duty to determine the 
facts in this case, and to consider and weigh the 
evidence for that purpose", "You are exclusive 
judges of the facts and the evide" (Emphasis 
added) The tnal court then entered judgmenUBased 
upon the evidence and the special verdict" (Emphasis 
added) Thus, the jury was not merely advisory 
Rather, the jury found the facts as set forth in its special 
verdict and the tnal court entered judgment applying 
the law to those facts 
II Accord and Satisfaction 
[6] % 18 The Dishingers argue that an accord and 
satisfaction occurred pnor to tnal which set the rental 
rate at $19 per square foot thus precluding a finding of 
unlawful detainer They claim the jury's special verdict 
answers require a legal determination of accord and 
satisfaction Whether the special verdict established an 
accord and satisfaction is a question of law which we 
review for correctness without any deference to the tnal 
court SeeProMaxDev Corp v Raile 2000 UT 4^ 
17, 998 P 2d 254 
A Elements of Accord and Satisfaction 
[7] ^ 119 To establish an accord and satisfaction, 
three elements must be present "(1) an unliquidated 
claim or a bona fide dispute over the amount due, (2) a 
payment offered as full settlement of the entire dispute, 
and (3) an acceptance of the payment as full settlement 
of the dispute " Id at ^  20 (citmg Marton Remodeling 
v Jensen, 706 P 2d 607,609-10 (Utah 1985)) 
1 Bona Fide Dispute Over Amount Due 
[8] [9] K 20 To satisfy the first element, "There must 
be a good-faith disagreement over the amount due 
under the contract The disagreement need not be well-
founded, so long as it is m good Estate 
Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc v 
Mountain States Tel & Tel Cc 844 P 2d 322, 326 
(Utah 1992) (citmg Golden Key Realty, Inc v Mantas, 
699 P 2d 730, 733 (Utah 1985 Ashton v Sheen 85 
Utah 489, 496, 39 P 2d 1073, 1076 (1935)) The jury 
clearly found that there was a good faith disagreement 
over the amount due under the lease (FN5) The jury 
was asked 
Considering all of the evidence in this case, do you 
find by a preponderance of the evidence that a 
legitimate dispute existed as to the "then prevailing 
rental rate of similar buildings in the Mam Street 
Copynght (c) West Group 2002 No claim to onginal U S Govt works 
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.area of Park City" at the time the 11 )< JungerH made 
monthly rental payments based on ' - ^ • 
foot as satisfaction in full? 
" hus, the first eleiw*, „*xord and satisfaction was 
established by the jury's special verdict. 
2. Payment Tendered in Full Satisfaction of Dispute 
'f 21 Hie jury found that "the payments tendered by 
the Dishingers were made in full satisfaction of the 
disputed rent. The jury was asked: "Considering all the 
evidence in this case, do you find by a preponderance 
of the evidence that the [Dishingers] notified [Potter] 
that these payments were made m full satisfaction of the 
disputed rent amount?" The jury answered, "Yes." 
Thus, the second element of accord and satisfaction 
was established by the jury's special verdict. 
3 Acceptance of Payment as Full Settlement of 
Dispute 
If 22 In Estate Landscape, the Utah Supreme Court 
reasoned that the third element of accord and 
satisfaction may be satisfied by the creditor's subjective 
intent to discharge an obligation by assenting to the 
accord, oi conduct which gives rise to a reasonable 
inference that acceptance of payment discharged the 
obligation. See Estate Landscape, 844 P.2d at 330 
f 23 In the instant case, the jury found that Potter 
accepted the monthly payments made by the 
Dishingers. The jury was asked: "Considering all of 
the evidence in this case, do you find by a 
preponderance of the evidence that [Potter] accepted 
the monthly rent payments made by the [Dishingers] 
which are calculated at a rate of $ 19 per square foot?" 
The jury answered, "Yes." However, the jury did not 
make a finding that Potter subjectively intended to 
assent to the accord. The fact that Potter counter-
claimed for breach of the lease and unlawful detainer 
shows she did not subjectively intend to assent to the 
accord. Thus, to find an accord and satisfaction, we 
must determine whether Potter's conduct established 
the accord and satisfaction as a matter of law 
«!j 24 ft Estate Landscape the delendant M;M; the 
plaintiff a check for $8,613, and followed it with a 
letter stating that the check was "payment in full for 
satisfaction of contracted services. If you are not 
willing to accept that sum, in full satisfaction of the 
C^pMliii1! V\tM h|.>.:!- v)()2 
-nm* due. DO NOT negotiate the check, for upon your 
urgotiation of that check, we will treat the matter as 
'•illy paid.' Ic at 324-25 (emphasis omitted) The 
w '-»V filed suit to recover the $30,162.50 it thought 
.i wa; owed by the defendant, then negotiated the 
$8,613 check, and amended its complaint to recover 
the difference. See id. at 325. 
% 25 The trial court ruled that negotiation of the 
check did not constitute an accord and satisfaction. See 
id. This court affirmed, over Judge Jackson's dissent, 
reasoning that the defendant's letter was "entirely 
unilateral," and that the plaintiffs 
signature on the check is not an assent to an accord 
not found on the face of the check as a restrictive 
endorsement, where the party to whom the accord is 
offered has expressly rejected the proposed accord, 
continued the dispute, and filed ,M".ytion to resolve 
it adversarial Iv in court 
**6 t Mtuf /.u//uv>ci^/t i*. v/i.vi ticmisxai 
Specialists, Inc. v Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co.. 
793 P.2d 415, 419-20 (Utah Ct.App.1990) <footnote 
omitted),revW, 844 P.2d 322 (I Jtah 1992). 
1| 26 The Utah Supreme Court disagreed and 
reversed, holding, "Where, as here, the check is 
tendered under the condition that negotiation will 
constitute full settlement, mere negotiation of the check 
constitutes the accord, regardless of the payee's efforts 
or intent to negate the condition Estate Landscape, 
844 P.2d at 330. Thus, " '[w]hat is said is overridden 
by what is done, and assent is imputed as an inference 
of law/ Id. (quoting Hudson v. Ynnkers Fruit Co., 
258 N.Y. 168, 179 N.E. 373, 374 (193: see also 
Morton Remodeling v. dense 706 P.2d 607, 609 
(Utah 1985) (holding negotiation of check with 
restrictive condition is an accord and satisfaction even 
though creditor wrote "not lull payment" beneath 
condition pnor to negotiation) Cove View Excavating 
& Constr. Co. v. Fly) 758 P.2d 474, 478 (Utah 
Ct.App.1988) (finding an accord and satisfaction even 
though creditor crossed out restrictive condition on 
check before negotiation) 
1j 27 In the mstant case, the Dislunger's first check 
noted the amount thereof was for "New Base Rent." 
Therefore, because Potter negotiated the check, which 
was tendered by the Dishmgers in full satisfaction of 
the disputed amount of the base monthly rent, the fact 
that Potter at the same time brought an action for 
;> claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
2001 WL 726259, Dishinger v. Pottei , (Utah App. I •• » 
breach of lease and •'unlawful detainer is of no legal 
consequence. (FN6) The third and final element of 
accord and satisfaction was established by Potter's 
conduct. 
B. Special Verdict 
\ 28 In its special verdict, the jury found: (1) "that a 
legitimate dispute existed as to the 'then prevailing 
rental rate of similar buildings in the Mam Street area 
of Park City' at the time the [Dishingers] made monthly 
rental payments based on $19 per square foot as 
satisfaction in full;" (2) the Dishingers "notified [Potter] 
that [the] payments were made in full satisfaction of the 
disputed amount;" and (3) Potter "accepted the monthly 
rent payments made by the [Dishingers] at a rate of 
$ 19 per square foot." 
\ 29 However, the jury also found that the 
prevailing rental rate was $25 per square foot, and that 
Potter was entitled to recover the "balance of base rent" 
from the Dishingers, totaling $8,730. Based on these 
findings, the trial court entered judgment for Potter, 
concluding that no accord and satisfaction existed and 
that the Dishingers were in unlawful detainer because 
the amount Potter received and accepted each month 
was less than what the jury subsequently determined to 
be the rental rate. 
(MH* Ms Although it could be argued that the 
special verdict supports inconsistent legal theories 
(accord and satisfaction and unlawful detamer), the 
inconsistency is not fatal The jury was instructed to 
answer all factual questions on all legal theories 
presented in the special verdict. While the jury's 
findings support inconsistent legal claims, a court is not 
precluded, under Rule 49(a), from applying the law to 
those findings and entering judgment for a party on one 
theory, as a matter of law, which precludes judgment 
on another inconsistent legal theor SeiMilligan v. 
Capitol Furniture Co. 8 Utah 2d 383, 387, 335 P.2d 
619, 622 (1959) (holding inconsistent special verdict 
answers immaterial under Utah R. Civ. P. 49(a see 
also Tsudek v. Target Stores, Inc 414 N.W.2d 466, 
469-70 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (finding inconsistent 
special verdict answers reconcilable where jury was 
simply answering all questions submitted based on the 
evidence). Thus, as was the case here, if the special 
verdict findings support, as a matter of law, an accord 
and sati si act ion then there cannot be an unlawful 
detainer. 
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C. Effect of Lease Provision 
'
 i
 " 7 [ 1111" 31 Potter responds that even if 'the 
jury's special verdict findings support an accord and 
satisfaction, the lease itself precludes an accord and 
satisfaction. Potter relies on the "Waiver" provision of 
the lease which states: 
riie waiver by Landlord of any term, covenant or 
condition herein contained shall not be deemed to 
be a waiver of such terms, covenant or condition or 
any subsequent breach of the same or any other 
temi. covenant or condition herein containec The 
M-'^-t'quent acceptance of rent hereunder by 
*'h*h)rd shall not be deemed to be a waiver of 
mv preceding default by Tenant of any term, 
•ovcnant or condition of this Lease, other than the 
failure of Tenant to pay particular rent also 
accepted, regardless of Landlord's knowledge of 
such preceding default at the time of the acceptance 
of such rent, 
(Emphasis added.) Potter asserts that under this 
lease provision, "acceptance of partial rent could not 
constitute an accord and satisfaction." 
1(32 Though not perfectly drafted, the boilerplate 
language of this "Waiver" provision is not ambiguous. 
The relevant portion, emphasized above, provides that 
if the Dishingers default on any term, covenant, or 
condition of the lease, and thereafter tender a rental 
payment to Potter, and Potter accepts, by accepting. 
Potter has not waived the prior defaults. For example, 
if the Dishmgers mstall exterior lighting as prohibited 
by the lease, the installation, if not cured within thirty 
days of notice, is a default. If, thereafter, the 
Dishingers send Potter a rent check winch Potter 
accepts. Potter has not waived the Dishinger's default 
for the installation. However, if the Dishinger's default 
for failure to pay rent, and thereafter tender a rental 
payment to Potter, which Potter accepts, Potter thereby 
waives the Dishinger's default for failure to pay rent. 
I! 33 What the lease provision does not provide, is 
that acceptance of partial rent does not constitute an 
accord and satisfaction. In fact, the term "accord and 
satisfaction" is conspicuously absent from the face of 
the lease, and beyond the "Waiver" provision, Potter 
fails to point to any language in the lease that would 
support her strained construction. Additionally, and 
perhaps more importantly, Potter cannot claim that the 
initial check tendered by the Dishmgers was "partial 
cl aim to original' x t M >\ \ works 
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rent," when there was never an agreement as to what 
would actually be the rental rate. Whi le hindsight 
suggests that Potter should have provided for such a 
situation in the lease, we cannot write such a provision 
into the lease for h Se Jones v. ERA Brokers 
Consol., 2000 UT 61118, 6 P.3d 1129 see alscRio 
Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 
1980); Provo City Corp. v. Nielsen Scott Co., 603 P.2d 
803, 806 (Utah 1979). Thus, Potter's argument that the 
lease prohibits an accord and satisfaction is not 
S u p p o r t e d l n lh< leas-: i l s r l f 
|^ .34 In sum, the jury's special verdict established as 
a matter of law an accord and satisfaction. The trial 
court erred in not entering a judgment on the rental rate 
for the option period in favor of the Dishingers. We 
therefore reverse the trial court's judgment of unlawful 
detainer and remand for the entry of a judgment for the 
Dishingers based on the legal theory of accord and 
satisfaction setting the rental rate at $19 per square 
foot. (FN7) 
III A dministi ative I ate and, Attorney Fees 
* *8 112] Tf 35 Potter argues that the lease provides 
that the Dishingers shall pay administrative, late, and 
attorney fees. Potter submitted her claims for 
administrative and late fees to the jury. In its special 
verdict, the jury found that, in addition to what the 
Dishingers had already paid to Potter, Potter was only 
entitled to the "Balance of base rent." Based on this 
finding, the trial court determined that Potter was not 
entitled to administrative and late fees. However, this 
was properly a legal not a factual determination. The 
lease is clear and unambiguous that Potter was entitled 
to administrative fees The lease states m no uncertain 
terms that the tenant shall pay for all costs and fees 
associated with supervising and administering to the 
common areas. (FN8) 
*[ 36 The Dishingers respond that Potter's argument 
for administrative fees was not presented below. 
However, the trial court clearly ruled on the issue based 
on the jury's special verdict findings. Thus, Potter's 
•
 %1a-m for administrative fees was presented below. 
'therefore, we reverse and remand to the trial court for 
an award of Potter's administrative fees. 
f 1 3] 1] 37 1 he lease fi it thei pi oxides: 
Tenant shall pay to Landlord late charge of ten 
($1000) dollars per day Iin, til, the amount due is 
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paid in Ml. Tenant farther agrees to , -tv -n-
attorney's fees [sic] incurred by Landlord b} reason 
of Tenant's failure to pay rent and/or other charges 
when due hereunder. 
(Emphasis added.) Thus, Potter was only entitled 
to It „te fees and attorney fees 'under 'this provision if the 
Dishingers .failed to pay rent. Because we conclude 
there was an accord and satisfaction, the Dishingers 
::::! ;:; current on their rent payments and therefore 
P : It; ::II: was not entitled to late fees. (FN9) 
[14] f 38 The trial court determined that Potter was 
not entitled to attorney fees because the lease provided 
that the "prevailing party shall be entitled to recover" 
<nomey fees, and while Potter prevailed on her 
er-ciaim, the Dishingers prevailed on their claims 
for an accounting and credit for overcharges of 
common area expenses. Thus, the trial court 
determined neither party should be awarded attorney 
fees because both prevailed. 
1J 39 Because we conclude that there was an accord 
and satisfaction and thus no unlawful detamer, the 
"prevailing party" issue as to attorney fees should be 
reconsidered by the trial court on remand, rherefore, 
pursuant to the terms of the lease, Potter is entitled to 
her administrative fees, and we remand to have the trial 
court determine if either party should be awarded 
attorney fees as the "prevailing parn" under the lease. 
CONCI IJSION 
1]" 4() 'We conclude, based on the jury's special 
verdict, an accord and satisfaction occurred as a matter 
of law fixing the "then prevailing rental rate" for the 
option period of the lease at $19 per square foot in base 
monthly rent. Therefore, because the Dishingers were 
in lawful possession of the premises, we reverse the 
trial court's legal determination of unlawful detainer 
and its award of treble damages. We further conclude 
that under the terms of the lease, Potter was entitled to 
her administrative fees and remand for the trial court to 
determine if either party is entitled to attorney fees as 
the "prevailing party" under the lease. 
II 41 I i i)N( III? Wll 1 I >\M >, IIUHRNE, Jr., 
Judge. 
Ok Ml- :tkh;e .di^enlim:s 
**9 c 42 1 cannot
 ()gie» there w a s an accord and 
satisfaction in this ease Whi le there w a s a bona fide 
claim .to original :, v> u o \ i works 
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ilispute over the new rental rate and the Dishingers may 
well have tendered their payments with the thought it 
was in full satisfaction of what was due, there is no 
finding that Pott accepte* the payments in full 
satisfaction nor any basis in the evidence to conclude 
that she did so. On the contrary, the Dishingers and 
Potter had exchanged letters indicating very different 
views of what constituted the "then prevailing rental 
rate." Nothing suggests either side thereafter acceded 
to the view of the other or that they reached a 
compromise. On the contrary, within days of accepting 
the Dishingers' check. Potter sent the Dishingers a 
default notice stating what she believed the shortfall to 
be. A couple of weeks later, the Dishingers filed their 
declaratory judgment action acknowledging there was a 
dispute between the parties and asking the court to 
resolve it-not claiming there had been a dispute 
between the parties that had been resolved by accord 
and satisfaction and asking the court: to enforce the 
accord. 
1J43 Applicable law does not require anything 
inconsistent with the expectations of the parties, as 
shown by their conduct The "New Base Rent" 
notation, apparently made in the "For " space 
on the front of the check, clearly does not satisfy the 
IJCC's requirement that "the instrument or an 
accompanying written communication contain! ] a 
conspicuous statement to the effect that the instrument 
was tendered ^.i full satisfaction of the claim." I Jtah 
Code Ann. § 70A-3-311(2) (1997) (emphasis added). 
In addition, cases relied on by the majority are 
inapposite. In both Marton Remodeling v. Jensen, 706 
P.2d 607 (Utah 1985), an Cove View Excavating & 
Construction Co. v. Fly 758 P.2d 474 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988), unlike in this case, the checks 
evidencing the accord and satisfaction contained actual 
restrictive endorsement provisio I Marton 
Remodeling, 706 P.2d at 608 ("Endorsement hereof 
constitutes full and final satisfaction of any and all 
claims...."); Cove Vie 758 P.2d at 476 (check 
contained "pmt. in full" language on front of check and 
this restrictive endorsement language on back of check; 
-t\ ment in full for all labor and materials to 6/26/84"). 
in Estate Landscape & Snow Removal Specialists, Inc. 
v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Cc 844 
P.2d 322 (Utah 1992), a detailed letter made it clear 
fhat the check could be accepted only as full payment. 
See id at 324-25. 
* 44 As a matter of law. the facts in this case do not 
estahii>h ji' t..^«:J n\.\ satisfaction. The jury 
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i : • :> : gnized this and. went on to find that the prevailing 
rental rate was $25 per square foot and that the 
Dishingers owed this to Potter under their contract. 
Does this mean the Dishingers unlawfully detained the 
<^nses, subjecting them to treble damages? It does 
Potter, in her "notice to pay rent or quit," 
demanded payment of a sum well in excess of what she 
' led to contractually. The jury found the 
rate was $25, but she had demanded 
payment of $30. The invalid demand renders the notice 
•pletely ineffective to place the Dishingers in a state 
awful detainer 
--•-ii). % 45 W hen the dust settles in this ca^. .im-
proper result emerges with reasonable clarity I he 
Dishingers did not owe as much as Potter thought they 
did, but they owed more than they thought they did. 
There was no accord and satisfaction, so they are liable 
for the shortage. On the other hand, Potter had no right 
to demand payment of an amount to which she was not 
entitled, so she may not have the lesser amount to 
which she was actually entitled trebled, nor is she 
entitled to any other relief specially available under the 
unlawful detainer statute. Clearly, then, there is no 
prevailing party here-each side won a little and lost a 
little-so neither side is entitled to an award of attorney 
fees. 
*\\ 46 On remand, f would simply have the trial court 
amend its judgment to reflect the foregoing 
(FN I.) From a review of the record it appeai-s that the 
Dishingers were paying $18.48 per square foot in 
minimum monthly rent at the time they notified 
!>
 »nor of *heir desire to exercise the option. 
(1-N2 ) The Dishingers subtracted $160.19 from the 
Uil\ 1, 1996 rental payment for remaining credits 
siki premature Consumer Price Index increases 
occurring in 1994 and 1995. 
(FN3.) The Dishinger's citations to the record 
reference the jury's special verdict; the Dishinger's 
motion for entry of judgment based on special 
verdict; the Dishinger's memorandum in support of 
motion for relief from judgment; and the 
Dishinger's supplemental memorandum in support 
of motion for relief from judgment. In all these 
instances the issue of accord and satisfaction was 
raised in the trial court. 
(FN4.) We note the issue of accord and satisfaction 
was not raised in the pleadings. However, Rule 
15(b) of the I Jtah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
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that issues not raised in 'the pleadings may be tried 
by express or implied consent. See Utah R. Civ. P. 
15(b). "If an issue is fully tried, a court may decide 
the issue and deem the pleadings amended even if 
the issue was not originally pleaded." Shinkoskey v. 
Shinkoskey, 2001 UT App 4^6 n. 2, 19 P.3d 
1005 (citingFishery, Fisher, 907 P.2d 1172, 1176 
(Utah Ct.App.1995) (citation omitted)). "Whether 
the pleadings may be deemed amended depends on 
whether the opposing party had a fair opportunity to 
[prepare and meet the issue). Id (citing Caiman 
v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 785 (Utah Ct.App.1987) 
). It must be evident from the record that the issue 
has been tried., See id, (citing Fisher, 907 P.2d at 
1176). 
A review of the record reveals that evidence 
regarding the existence of an accord and 
satisfaction was presented at trial, and the jury was 
instructed on and made findings of fact that would 
support an accord and satisfaction. Additionally, 
the Dishingers argued accord and satisfaction in 
their motion for entry of judgment based on special 
verdict, which Potter had the opportunity to rebut, 
and the trial court entered judgment finding there 
was no accord and satisfaction. Thus, because 
Potter had the opportunity to prepare and meet the 
issue, we conclude that the issue of an accord and 
satisfaction, was tried by implication 
(FN5.) Although neitlier party has addressed this issue 
in their briefs, we note at the outset that the option 
provision in the lease is most likely unenforceable 
in Utah. It is a well-recognized principle that, "A 
condition precedent to the enforcement of any 
contract is that there be meeting of the mind of 
the parties, which must be spelled out, either 
expressly or implicitly, with sufficient definiteness 
to be enforced.' Pingree v. Continental Group of 
Utah, Inc. 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976) 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted). Pingree, 
'V T Ttab Supreme Court stated, 
"a provision for the extension or renewal of a lease 
must specify the time the lease is to extend and the 
rate to be paid with such a degree of certainty and 
definiteness that nothing i.s loll to future 
determination. If it falls short of this requirement it 
is not enforceable." 
Id at 1321 (quoting Slayter v. Pas ley, 199 C)i ,. 616, 
264 P.2d 444, 446 (Or. 1953)). 
Copyright I U A ^ H a 
In the instant case, the lease provided that the rental 
rate for the renewal period would be "the then 
prevailing rental rate of similar buildings in the 
Mam Street area of Park City." On July 1, 1996, 
the commencement of the renewal period, the 
parties had yet to agree on what constituted "the 
then prevailing rental rate of similar buildings in the 
Main Street area of Park City." Both parties had 
communicated to the other a vastly different rate 
and interpretation, and the Dishingers filed a 
declaratory judgment action asking the trial court to 
interpret the provision. Thus, it cannot be said that 
the rate provided for in the option provision of the 
lease possesses the certainty and definiteness 
required to be enforced. In sum, there was no 
meeting of the mmds, and as a result, no agreement. 
Therefore, the lease terminated by its own terms as 
of July 1, 1996. However, "because we conclude 
that an accord and satisfaction occurred, the 
unenforceability of the option provision does not 
affect our analysis. 
**!()_ (FN6.) In response, Potter attempts to rely on. 
language froi Tales, Inc. v. Little America 
Refining Co., 535 P.2d 1228 (Utah 1975), wherein 
our supreme court stated, "Ordinarily, the payment 
of part of a debt does not discharge it.... The reason 
for this is that in making the part payment, the 
debtor is doing nothing more than he is legally 
obligated to dc / at 1229. This general 
statement is true, to the extent that there is no 
"dispute or uncertainty as to the amount due." Id. at 
1229-30. In the instant case it is well established 
that there is a dispute as to the amount due. 
(l*NV.) Because we conclude there was an accord and 
satisfaction and thereby reverse the trial court's 
' : :s! conclusion that the Dishingers were in 
^lawful detainer, we do not address the 
Dishinger's alternative argument of waiver and 
Potter's cross-appeal regarding the definition of the 
term "prevailing rate." 
(r;\rt / :>peci> a < M 
shall pay 
All costs to supervise and administer said common 
areas, used m common by the tenants or occupants 
of the building. [S]aid costs shall include such fees 
as may be paid to a third party m connection with 
same and shall in any event include a tee to 
!:,„ 
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Landlord to supervise and administer same in an 
amount equ.i' »•• v.n * L'°.>> .^! f t- total costs of iT) 
tb^Ve 
\\'W ) Potter does not argue she was entitled to 
attorney fees under this provision. 
Copyright (c) West Group 2002 No claim to original U.S. Govt, works 
2059 
RECEIVED 
SF.P 2 8 2001 is 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
FILED
 DT 
UTAH SUPREME COURT 
i n i i, 
Marc S m i t h , 
PAT BARTHOLOMEW 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
P1 a i i 11: i f f and P e t i t i o n e r , 
v, Case No. 20010667-SC 
Grand Canyon Expeditions Co, : 
Martin Mathis; Michael Denoyei; 
Donald Saunders; John Does 1 
through 5; a n d Ja n e D o e s 1 
through LJ , 
Defendant f» and Petitioners . 
ORDER 
This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for Permission to 
Appeal an Interlocutory Order, filed pursuant to Rule 5 of the 
Utah R\ iJ es of Appe11 ate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Permission to Appeal 
an Interlocutory Order filed on August 1 7, 2001 i s granted. 
E or Ti le Coi rr t : 
^ / ^ ^ i 
Date 
Richard C. Howe 
Chief Justice 
20 5 IS 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on September 2 7, 2001, a ti ue and correct 
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States 
mail to the party(ies) listed below: 
BENSON L. HATHAWAY 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
215 S STATE ST STE 1150 
PO BOX 810 
SALT LAKE CITY NT --I ill 
JOHN A. ANDERSON 
MATTHEW M. DURHAM 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
201 S MAIN ST STE 1100 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited 
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below: 
SIXTH DISTRICT, RICHFIELD DEPT 
ATTN: MARILYN 
895 E 300 N 
RICHFIELD I IT 84701 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No. 20010667-SC 
SIXTH DISTRICT, RICHFIELD DEPT , 940600003 
By 
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ADDENDUM 
RECEIVED 
NOV 16 2001 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
DISTRIC Rl', KANE COUNT\ , I I'l A11 
76 North Main 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
Telephone (435) 644-2458 Fax: (435) 644-2052 
!'» J , \ \ i j ! I! II |ll II I I , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
G R A N D C A N Y O N EXPEDITIONS CO., 
MARTIN M A T H I S ; MICHAEL DENOYER ; 
D O N A L D S A U N D E R S ; , 
Defendant 
I ID LE 54(1)) CERTIFICATION AND 
ENTRY OP .JUDGMENT 
Case M«: >„ 940600003 
Assigned Judge: K. L. McIFF 
Thrice this matter has been before the court on summary judgment proceedings and thrice 
the court has made legal rulings whul i I. n ." m i " ',h'lll,ii " iinr * uunin iy lo> " ' j | 
The parties have now jointly petitioned the court to enter a final judgment as to the claims 
which have been addressed in the court i« lulling i n'mniijcl icpn'M'-ni iliiiiil lllliii11. ill I r ill i iiiiinist 
economical means of resolving a dispute that cannot be settled, They reason, that this will ensure 
only on<* ^ , - *\ 
« ^  thoughtful *onsideration t.ul .w, J:.I * j«hontv at Rule ? itb *\ ^ ^r court 
express,, jeutru. 4 * 1001, 
in ipui.mng its Memorandum Decisions of Jamutn ^ < larch JO, 2000 and January : 6 
"'(Mil, i« certified as fin.-i \ 
2041 
RULE 54(b) Certification and Entry of Judgment, Case number 940600003, Page -2 
Dated this day of August, 2001. 
K I , 
District C^urt ;.*jbe 
On Augusi 
method indicated: 
Addressee 
C E R T I F I C A T E Q F S E R V I C £ 
< v.^ p> ui the above was sent to each of the following by "the 
I V'fett 1,0(1 fM-mmt, r-lnpwtQft. f^fmS AdAiih\Stlt Method 
Benson I ,. Hathaway, Jr. 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
215 South State Street 
Suite 1150 
PO Box 810 
Salt Lake r 
fin] John A, Anderson 
STOEL RIVES 
One Utah Center 
20lMain Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, I JT 84 i l l 
n 
[IB] 
ifciu.^1 i ^ W j L ^ 
H;\home\CON€VfO>lviMCCFF\KANE\SmwhvOr*n(l.RuleS4 
U«-||| 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
John A. Anderson (4464) 
Matthew M. Durham (6214) 
201 Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3131 
Attorneys for Defendants 
• "
:
 IIIDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARC SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
i. * v •. - i VJN EXPEDITIONS CO.; 
MAR UN \1 A THIS; MICHAEL 
DENOYHR; DONALD SAUNDERS; 
JOHN IX )ES 1 through 5; and JANE 
DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
Plaintiff and defendants submit the following points and authorities in support of their 
joint motion for Rule 54(b) certification. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPOR"I « >(• 
lOINT MOTION FOR 
! ~.UK\ rFRTTFl" \ ] '( M 
Civil No. 940600003 
SaltLake-138286.1 0033714-00001 
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INTRODUCTION 
This court already is aware of the procedural historj vi mio case. ,,^ ..a., 
K)f memorandum decisions have granted summary judgment 
in favor of defendants on plaintiffs wrongful termination claim,., on his breach of implied 
co\ eiiaiit of good faith a nd fail dealii ig claii n as it relates to his emplo) ment contract with Grand 
Canyon and on plaintiffs breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim based 
on i ric iJu- c . Agreement excepl to Ilk i \tcnl il iu\ i, >L es lL Ai i ^ wii.i Niimsemeiil l.i< kfund 
issue. The court has also granted summary judgment on plaintiffs prayer for punitive damages 
and for attorneys' fees as consequential damages. The court denied nummary ju.iginu e 
ii • ' ne Arizona Amusementlax question, i mail\. the co-m h.ia denied 
plaintifi lea\ e U) amend to assert a claim for unjust enrichment arising i -ui -i UK \nzona 
r : - . . • • I . I •• ; 
Plaintiff and defendants stipulated to continue the trial date based upon their agreement 
that they would seek Rule > 1(h) 4 ulilicahon ul .ill issues appn piuh1 I' i MII tt r.'itifh'ali' n nil 
file a joint petition tor inh-rloeutc-rv appeal on all remaining issues that were not appropriate for 
Rule 54(b) certitication . iu panics nave prepared a petition for intei loci ltoi > appeal (the 
"Petition") which they have filed contemporanc >u,\h with this motion. The Petition may be 
conditioned upon this court certifying the issues described below pursuant to 1 • ... : -
e 'ei it tl: i,e cc i u t grai its 54(b) certification but the court of appeals denies the petition lot interlocu-
tor}' appeal, the parties will seek to stay the 54(b) appeal pending trial of all remaining issues. 
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ARGUMENT 
1. The Claims for Which Plaintiff and Defendants Seek Rule 54fb) Certification Are 
Appropriate for Such Certification to the Utah Supreme Court. 
Rule 54(b) provides that the court's prior memorandum decisions are not final orders as 
they do not dispose of all claims for relief against all parties. See, e.g., Bradbury v. Valencia, 
2000 UT 50, 5 P.3d 649, 651 (Utah 2000). Rule 54(b) also provides, however, that where more 
than one claim for relief is present in an action and/or when multiple parties are involved, the 
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the claims of 
the parties upon certain conditions. Rule 54(b), Utah R. Civ. P. (2000). Those conditions are 
that the court make an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and expressly 
direct the entry of judgment. Id 
The court was fully advised of the grounds upon which plaintiff and defendants jointly 
sought continuance of the trial date. The parties then agreed, and still agree, that the most 
economical means of resolving a dispute that obviously will not be settled is to have all issues 
heard by the appropriate appellate court as soon as reasonably practicable. This will result in no 
trial at all, if the appellate court agrees with defendants, or a single trial, in the event the court 
agrees with the plaintiff. A failure to certify the case for immediate appeal will result in a trial of 
a single issue, an appeal of multiple issues beyond those tried, and possibly another trial of 
different issues. This result would plainly be inefficient for the reasons earlier discussed with the 
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court. Accordingly, this court may find that there is no just reason for delay, and certify as final 
its July 30, 2001 Order incorporating its Memorandum Decisions dated January 15, 1999, 
March 20, 2000, and January 26, 2001. 
DATED this day of August, 2001. 
STOEL RIVES, LLP 
John A. Anderson 
Attorneys for Defendants 
DATED this I $* day of August, 2001. 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
Benson L. Hathaway,y 
Attorneys for Plainti 
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STOEL RIVES LLP 
John A. Anderson (4464) 
Matthew M. Durham (6214) 
201 Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3131 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARC SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO.; 
MARTIN MATHIS; MICHAEL 
DENOYER; DONALD SAUNDERS; 
JOHN DOES 1 through 5; and JANE 
DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
JOINT MOTION FOR 
RULE 54(b) CERTIFICATION 
Civil No. 940600003 
Hon. K. L. Mclff 
Plaintiff and defendants hereby jointly move pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, for certification of the court's order dated July 30, 2001, incorporating its 
memorandum decisions dated January 15, 1999, March 20, 2000, and January 26, 2001, as 
follows: 
1. For a certification of finality of summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs wrongful 
termination claim; 
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2. For a certification of finality of summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs claim for 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing arising out of his employment 
relationship with defendant Grand Canyon Expeditions Company. 
The grounds for this motion are set forth in the accompanying joint memorandum of 
points and authorities. Plaintiff and defendants further represent to the court that they have 
prepared a petition for interlocutory appeal of all issues on which the court has either granted or 
denied summary judgment but for which Rule 54(b) certification is unavailable. Those issues 
include those portions of the prior memorandum decisions granting summary judgment on the 
breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim arising out of the Buy-Sell 
Agreement, together with plaintiffs prayer for punitive damages and attorneys' fees as 
consequential damages, as well as the court's denial of defendants' motions for summary 
judgment on all grounds asserted in support of that claim, denial of defendants' motion to 
dismiss the individual defendants, and denial of plaintiff s motion for leave to amend. 
DATED this day of August, 2001. 
STOEL RIVES, LLP 
John A. Anderson 
Attorneys for Defendants 
DATED this fy day of August, 2001. 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
Benson L. Hathaway, Jr. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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RECEIVED 
AUG - 2 2001 ^  
STIR6A & HATHAWAY 
BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR. (Bar No. 4138) 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-0810 
Telephone: (801) 364-8300 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARC SMITH, 
Plaintiff, ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
v. JUDGMENT 
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS 
CO., MARTIN MATHIS, MICHAEL 
DENOYER, RONALD R. SMITH, 
DONALD SAUNDERS, JOHN DOES 
1 through 5 and JANE DOES 1 
through 5, 
Defendants. 
Defendants' Third Motion for Summary Judgment came before the Court for hearing on 
November 20, 2000. Defendants filed two previous motions for summary judgment, and Plaintiff 
filed a previous Motion to Amend, which were fully briefed, argued and addressed in memorandum 
decisions on January 15,1999 and March 20, 2000. No prior memorandum decision of the Court 
has been reduced to an order. After hearing the arguments of counsel and having reviewed the 
pleadings and documents of record supporting and opposing Defendants' Third Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the Court ruled from the bench granting the Defendants' Third Motion in part 
«LH> 
tfAMPrni.MT. 
Civil No. 940600003 
Judge Kay McKiff 
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and denying it in part. Subsequently, upon the request of both parties, the Court took the matter 
under advisement and issued a Memorandum Decision on January 26, 2001, incorporating its 
January 15, 1999 and March 20, 2000 memorandum decisions. 
For the reasons set forth in this Court's January 15,1999, March 20, 2000, and January 26, 
2001 Memorandum Decisions, which three Memorandum Decisions are fully incorporated in this 
Order, and for good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs Motion for Leave to Amend its Complaint is denied. 
2. Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment are granted as to all of Plaintiffs 
claims, with the exception of Plaintiff s claim for breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing to the extent it pertains to Defendants' treatment of the Arizona amusement tax refund. 
DATED this «-A->>day of June, 2001. 
BY THE COURT 
Honorable K. L. Mclff 
Sixth District Court Judge 
Approved as 
STOI 
JOHN A. ANDERSON 
Attorndv for Defendants 
C:\MyFiles\SMITH\msj.ordcr.wpd 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this frl^y of June, 2001,1 caused to be served a true copy 
of the foregoing ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, by 
the method indicated below, to the following: 
John A. Anderson 
STOEL RIVES 
Attorney for Defendants 
201 South Main Street Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-4904 
C) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(^Hand Delivered 
( ) Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
C:\MyFiles\SMITH\msj.order.wpd 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On r /*/, 2000, a copy of the above ORDER ON DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT was sent to each of the following by the method indicated: 
Addressee Method (Mail, Person. Fax) Addressee Method (Mail, Person. Fax) 
Benson Hathaway 
215 South State Sti 
P O Box 810 
Salt Lake City Ut 84110 0810 
y\ John A Anderson f ip 
 t  t t  treet Suite 1150 210 South Main Street Suite 1100 
    Salt Lake City Ut 84111 4904 
fWLjferYtf ALA 
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BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR. (Bar No. 4138) 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
P.O. Box 810 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-0810 
Telephone: (801) 364-8300 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
^ o ^ O 
mm 
8$ 
Clerk 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARC SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS 
CO., MARTIN MATHIS, MICHAEL 
DENOYER, RONALD R. SMITH, 
DONALD SAUNDERS, JOHN DOES 
1 through 5 and JANE DOES 1 
through 5, 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO 
SUBSTITUTE PARTIES 
Civil No. 940600003 
Judge Kay McKiff 
Based on the Motion of Plaintiff pursuant to Utah R.Civ. P. 25(a), the death of Defendant 
Donald A. Saunders, and for other good cause appearing, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Glen Perez, the personal representative of 
the Estate of Donald A. Saunders, and the estate of Donald A. Saunders are hereby substituted as 
a Defendants, in the stead of Defendant Donald Saunders 
2029 
DATED this l^> day ofFcbroaryr 2001. 
BY THE COURT 
By: 
The Honoj? 
Sixth District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this typ day of February, 2001,1 caused to be served a true 
copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SUBSTITUTE 
PARTIES, by the method indicated below, to the following: 
John A. Anderson 
STOEL RIVES 
Attorney for Defendants 
201 South Main Street Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-4904 
Q U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
(tyiiand Delivered 
() Overnight Mail 
( ) Facsimile 
C:\MyFiles\SMITH\substituteparties.order.wpd 
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RECEIVED 
JAN 2 9 2 0 0 1 ' 
STfflBA* HATHAWAY 
DISTRICT COURT, KANE COUNTY, UTAH 
76 North Main 
Kanab,, Utah 84741 
Telephone: (435) 644-2458 Fax: (435) 644-2052 
MARC SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO., 
MARTIN MATHIS, MICHAEL DENOYER, 
DONALD SAUNDERS, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Defendants' Third Summary 
Judgment Motion) 
Case No. 940600003 
Assigned Judge: K. L. McIFF 
INTRODUCTION 
The Court has now heard three summary judgment motions filed by defendants. The first 
resulted in a Memorandum Decision dated January 15, 1999. The second resulted in a 
Memorandum Decision dated March 20, 2000. The Court incorporates both of those decisions 
herein including the recitation of facts. As a result of these prior rulings, plaintiffs remaining 
cause of action is limited to a claimed breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
Moreover, the Court has heretofore narrowed this claim so there are only two areas of potential 
recovery. One relates to a large tax refund received from the State of Arizona after plaintiffs 
forced departure, and the second relates to the manner in which the corporate defendant 
accounted for and valued certain assets included in the involuntary buyout. 
2022 
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DEFENDANT'S THIRD SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION 
In their third summary judgment motion, defendants argue that the same reasoning 
heretofore employed by the Court warrants summary judgement with respect to the remaining 
claims. 
In the event the Court does not grant complete summary judgment, defendants seek to 
further narrow the litigation. Specifically they seek dismissal of plaintiffs claim for punitive 
damages and also the claim for attorneys' fees as an element of consequential damages. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. SobekAVhitewater Accounting 
In August of 1990, defendant Grand Canyon Expeditions, Co. (hereafter Grand Canyon) 
reached an agreement for purchase of SobekAVhitewater assets which included personal property 
and a concession contract authorizing a "whitewater" operation in the Grand Canyon. This 
acquisition was not finalized until some 13 months later in September of 1991. 
Because of the close temporal proximity to plaintiffs forced departure in July of 1992, 
and because the facts were not previously fully developed, the Court concluded that there were 
issues of fact as to whether accounting decisions were influenced by plaintiffs impending 
departure. Specifically, the Court was concerned that depreciation schedules and the allocation of 
values to various components of the SobekAVhitewater purchase could have been manipulated to 
result in lesser compensation to the plaintiff. 
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It now appears clear that these accounting decisions were made prior to and completely 
uninfluenced by plaintiffs departure. The rupture and forced buyout of the stock all occurred 
during the month of July 1992, whereas the accounting decisions were made during the late fall of 
1991 and early spring of 1992. Moreover, they were essentially consistent with and in no event 
less advantageous to plaintiff than accounting practices and decisions made during the entire 
history of the corporation dating to its inception in 1986. 
Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that would support a finding by the trier of fact that 
the accounting methodology employed with respect to the Sobek/Whitewater acquisition was 
influenced in any manner by plaintiffs forced exit. 
The Court must therefore conclude that the accord reached between the parties during 
July 1992, as reflected in plaintiffs resignation and a settlement agreement, bar any claim arising 
from the Sobek/Whitewater transaction. There is simply no basis to give the latter separate 
treatment. 
B. The Arizona Tax Refund 
The sole area left open for trial relates to a large tax refund received from the State of 
Arizona. The relevant facts are really quite simple and have been discussed in both of the Court's 
prior memorandum decisions. At the time of the settlement by these parties in July of 1992, there 
was outstanding a million dollar tax refund claim lodged with the State of Arizona The president 
of defendant Grand Canyon had told counsel to abandon the claim. Counsel disregarded this 
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directive and purposely left the claim open under the express belief that it might ultimately be 
successful.1 Three years later it was successful and the corporation received a refund which was 
greater than the entire value of the corporation on which plaintiffs buy-out was premised. 
At the time plaintiff met with the corporate president in July of 1992 and reached a 
settlement, apparently neither was aware that the tax refund claim was being purposely kept alive 
by the corporation's counsel.2 It may be safely assumed that at some subsequent point the 
corporate president and other officials became aware of and cooperated with the effort to obtain 
and retain the refund. It did not just show up one day in the mail. 
The affidavit of corporate attorney Ann M. Dumenil unequivocally acknowledges purposely keeping 
the refund claim alive both before and after plaintiffs forced departure: 
Before Departure 
13- . . . I did not formally withdraw Grand Canyon's request, however, because I thought another 
rafting company might someday successfully challenge the transaction privilege tax; consequently, I 
believed that leaving Grand Canyon's request pending would be beneficial to Grand Canyon because they 
might be able to argue that they were entitled to a refund. 
After Departure 
17- I again made the determination that it was in Grand Canyon's best interest not to formally withdraw 
the request, but rather merely to cancel its hearing and wait to see if another company successfully 
challenged the tax. . . . 
18- the transaction privilege tax was subsequently challenged successfully by a another river rafting 
company in an appeal before the Arizona Supreme Court reported as Wilderness World, Inc. v. 
Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 108 (Ariz. 1995). 
In its second memorandum decision, the Court discussed possible imputation of knowledge to the 
president. Defendants insist that if the corporation or its president is charged with the knowledge of its attorney, it 
must also be imputed to the plaintiff who was a corporate official. The argument is flawed. Plaintiff was being 
forced out. It was an adversarial setting. To suggest that he should be treated as a corporate official in this context 
flies in the face of reason. The corporation stood to gain everything and plaintiff nothing by keeping the refund 
effort alive and by secreting it from the plaintiff. That is exactly what happened. 
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The simplicity of the facts belies the difficulty of the legal inquiry. The peculiar facts lend 
support to the Restatement's observation that "A complete catalogue of types of bad faith is 
impossible." §205, Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Comment d (1981). As the process 
unfolded, the corporate officials moved from a status of misinformation to awareness and on to 
active pursuit and recovery. In such circumstances, were they justified in stone cold silence 
toward plaintiff? Is there a legitimate legal basis for arguing that the duty of good faith and fair 
dealing reached far enough to require that plaintiff be advised that the facts were different than the 
parties supposed and that recovery was being pursued? When the million dollars came, were 
defendants entitled to pocket the same without any disclosure or obligation to plaintiff? These 
questions probe the outer limits of the doctrine in question. 
Utah courts have embraced § 205 of the Restatement which provides "every contract 
imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its 
enforcement." See, e.g., St. Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 1994, 
200 (Utah 1991). The covenant of good faith and fair dealing may be summarized as follows: 
The covenant requires honesty in fact. § 205, Comment a (1981). In some instances, it may 
require more than honesty. Id, Comment d. It can relate to acts or omissions. Id. Under the 
covenant parties impliedly promise that they will not intentionally or purposely do anything or fail 
to do anything which will injury the other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract. St. 
Benedicts, at 199. To comply with the covenant, the parties7 actions must be consistent with the 
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agreed common purpose of the contract and the reasonable expectations of the other party to the 
contract. Id. Moreover, it has been held that breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
is a fact issue usually left for determination by the jury. Republic Group, Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 
883 P.2d 285, 291 (Utah App. 1994); Western Farm CreditBankv. Pratt, 860 P.2d 376, 380 
(Utah App. 1993). The jury is obliged to consider the language of the contract documents and 
the course of dealing and conduct of the parties, but, as stated in St. Benedict's, "an examination 
of express contract terms alone is insufficient to determine whether there has been a breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." At 200. 
Defendants freely acknowledge that they have received an enormous windfall but deny any 
responsibility to plaintiff. They suggest that the governing principles are strictly legal and that 
fairness and equity have no place. They urge that the tax refund claim was contingent - not a 
"bookable asset" - and therefore irrelevant in the forced buyout. 
While it is true that contractual rights are generally legal rather than equitable, that does 
not mean that equity and fairness are completely foreign to the field. See 27A Am Jur 2d, Equity 
§ 164, page 561 (1996). As the words employed to describe the doctrine suggest, the "duty of 
good faith and fair dealing" is firmly rooted in notions of equity and fairness. The obligation 
arises by implication rather than by contractual expression. As previously noted, it is sometimes 
necessary to look beyond the express contract terms. St. Benedict's, at 200. The mere fact that 
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the tax refund claim was not labeled a "bookable asset" is not solely determinative of relevancy, 
nor of whether the duty of good faith and fair dealing has been breeched. 
As this litigation now stands, plaintiff thinks this Court has gone too far in limiting his 
potential remedy and defendants think the court has not gone far enough. Defendants argue that 
the resignation and settlement documents constitute complete waivers and give rise to complete 
defenses irrespective of the equities and the fact that the negotiating parties were unaware that the 
claim for refund was being kept alive and that it ultimately produced an enormous windfall. 
Plaintiffs counsel, on the other hand, claims that his client should now be able to go 
behind the settlement documents, not just as it relates to the Arizona tax refund which was not 
treated in any manner, but to upset the determination of "book value" on which the buy-out of 
plaintiffs stock was based. He claims that it was the common purpose and the reasonable 
expectation of the parties that plaintiff receive the "real value" rather than the "book value" of his 
stock and that the latter has been unduly and inappropriately impacted by accounting procedures 
over the years that have been designed for "tax purposes." His expert witness acknowledged that 
the approach of the corporate accountant in dealing with expenses, depreciation, purchase price 
allocations, etc., though "aggressive," was nonetheless within the range of generally accepted 
accounting principles. This does not satisfy plaintiff. Even though he benefitted from this 
accounting approach for a number of years and even though he agreed upon and executed a 
settlement document relying upon the values fixed by the corporate accountant, he now claims 
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that the duty of good faith and fair dealing requires that the corporate accountant start anew from 
the inception of the corporation, re-evaluate all transactions, reallocate the purchase price, 
recalculate depreciation schedules and revisit treatment of expenses to see if they were 
appropriate. He opines that only in this way can the "real value" of the corporation be determined 
resulting in fair treatment to him in the buy-out. 
Plaintiff not only disregards the history of the corporation but what happened in the 
buyout. When the rupture occurred, plaintiff met with the corporate president. They talked. 
They negotiated. Concessions were made. They agreed upon additional consideration for 
plaintiff. Documents were prepared. Plaintiff had them for several days before signing. Both 
parties signed. The agreed-upon payments were made for a year and a half before plaintiff filed 
suit. Moreover, the payments were not at "book value" but at 140% of book value as required by 
the buy/sell and settlement agreements. This waters down plaintiffs claim that "real value" has 
been completely ignored. There is too much meaning in this history and the settlement documents 
to allow them to be disregarded. 
After thoughtful consideration and reconsideration, this Court has concluded and now 
reconcludes that the basic value matters were resolved and merged into the settlement documents. 
This has been extensively discussed in the Court's two prior memorandum decisions. The sole 
exception to all of this relates to the Arizona tax refund which simply was not discussed nor 
contemplated when the settlement documents were prepared and executed and is entirely beyond 
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the fixing of values by the accountant. When this oversight was discovered and the refund 
materialized, defendants' only response was to pocket the money. It was not until late in the 
litigation that the disclosures regarding the Arizona tax refund were forthcoming. 
A jury could reasonably conclude that defendants' acts and /or omissions were 
inconsistent with common purposes and reasonable expectations. As such they may fail to 
comply with the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff ought to have the opportunity to 
make that case to the jury whose right it is to resolve the issue of breach. 
C. Punitive Damages 
Plaintiffs sole remaining claim is for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
This claim sounds in contract rather than in tort. St Benedict's, at 199. It is well established that 
punitive damages are not recoverable for breach of contract. Cook Associates, Inc. v. Warnick, 
664 P.2d 1161, 1167 (Utah 1983). Moreover, there is an absence of alleged facts which come 
close to the egregious facts required to support a punitive damage claim. If the trial in this matter 
produces an appropriate foundation, the Court could always revisit this ruling. 
D. Attorney Fees as Consequential Damages 
In Canyon Country Store v. Braceyt 781 P.2d 414 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme Court 
allowed recovery of attorney fees as consequential damages in an action for breach of an 
insurance contract. The contract did not provide for attorney fees and they were incurred in the 
context of first-party rather than third-party litigation. The court acknowledged departure from 
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the well-established rule that attorney fees generally can not be recovered unless provided for by 
statute or by contract. 
The result in Bracey was analyzed by the Court of Appeals in Collier v. Heinz, 827 P.2d 
982 (Utah App. 1992). The Heinz court noted that Bracey went beyond the previously 
recognized exception that allowed attorneys fees as foreseeable consequential damages only 
where the injured party incurred attorney fees through litigation with a third party. 
The Heinz court resolved what it termed "a problematic conflict" by concluding that athe 
award of attorney fees as consequential damages, outside the context of statutory and contractual 
authorization, should be limited to . . . two situations . . . : insurance contracts and the third-party 
exception." At 984. The opinion seems to have been an effort to "tidy-up" and leave the 
precedential footprint clean. It was not to be. 
The ink was barely dry on the Heinz decision when the Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992). The Heslop court added another 
exception, i.e., employment termination cases.3 A former bank employee was able to recover 
attorney fees as consequential damages for wrongful termination by the bank. 
3
 It may not be conceptually accurate to think only in terms of "exception" categories. It may be more 
appropriate to examine the relative strength of the claims and defenses and the disparity of strength in the 
relationship. A clear disparity of strength exists between an insurer and its insured, and between an employer and 
an employee. Depending upon the circumstances, it could also exist in cases such as this where a minority owner 
lacks any bargaining strength in a forced buyout. 
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It is by no means certain that development of the law in this area is at an end. However, it 
is worth noting that Heinz and Heslop were decided in 1992 and there does not appear to be any 
subsequent cases that have treated the subject or identified any new areas of exception to the 
general rule. Plaintiff argues that this Court should venture into the unknown and defendant 
argues that should only be done by the Supreme Court. 
Given the prior rulings herein and the nature of the limited claim which remains, it is this 
Court's view that the facts are not of sufficient strength to warrant departure from the general 
rule. If the evidence at trial dictates otherwise, the matter can be revisited. 
CONCLUSION 
Having declined to grant summary judgment as to all claims, trial herein shall go forward. 
GOVERN YOURSELVES ACCORDINGLY. 
Dated this ^\£?day of January, 2001. 
K. iTMcIff) 
District Court Judge 
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CERTMCATE OF SERVICE 
On January £j(^ , 2001 a copy of the above ORDER was sent to each of the following 
by the method indicated: 
Addressee Method (M=mad, P=in person, F=Fax) Addressee Method (M=mail, P=m person, F=Fax) 
Mr. John A. Anderson [m] Mr. Benson Hathaway [m] 
STOEL RIVES STERBA & HATHAWAY 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100 215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 Salt Lake City, UT 8111 
^ '&€*4Jr_ J 
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STOEL RIVES LLP 
John A. Anderson (4464) 
Matthew M. Durham (6214) 
201 Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3131 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SDCTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARC SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS 
CO., MARTIN MATHIS; MICHAEL 
DENOYER; DONALD SAUNDERS; 
JOHN DOES 1 through 5; and JANE 
DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF ARIZONA ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF MARICOPA ) 
Ann M. Dumenil, having been first sworn, deposes and states: 
1. I am a resident of Maricopa County, Arizona, over the age of majority, and 
otherwise competent to make this affidavit. 
2. I am an attorney duly licensed to practice law in the State of Arizona; I am 
associated with the law firm of Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, P.L.C., in Phoenix, Arizona. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
ANN M. DUMENIL 
Civil No. 940600003 
Hon. K. L. Mclff 
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3. In 1990, Jennings, Strouss & Salmon was retained by Grand Canyon 
Expeditions Co. ("Grand Canyon") to represent it in connection with a dispute with the 
Arizona Department of Revenue (" ADOR") over Grand Canyon's payment of certain use taxes 
to the state of Arizona. 
4. The ADOR was attempting to collect from Grand Canyon taxes for food 
purchased outside Arizona, but brought into that state during river trips. 
5. In December 1990,1 sent Michael R. Denoyer, President of Grand Canyon, a 
draft Notice of Protest and Request for Refund (the "Notice of Protest") for filing with the 
ADOR. (A copy of the draft Notice of Protest, along with my letter to Mr. Denoyer is 
attached to Grand Canyon's Supporting Memorandum as Exhibit "I.") 
6. The draft Notice of Protest was intended to challenge the assessment of the use 
tax mentioned above; it also, however, requested a refund of a transaction privilege (sales) tax 
in the amusement classification under Arizona state tax laws. See Supp. Mem. Ex. "I." 
7. Although Grand Canyon had not requested that I include the request for a refund 
of the transaction privilege tax, I had prepared such a request for Grand Canyon's predecessor 
and included it in Grand Canyon's request. I believed the request was advisable because other 
taxpayers in Arizona, including the owner of Grand Canyon's predecessor, were challenging 
the tax or defending other audits by the ADOR. Id* 
8. I explained in my letter that, although I did not believe Grand Canyon would 
actually prevail on the transaction privilege tax refund, the request was strategically advisable 
because it could serve as a bargaining offset of approximately $21,000 on Grand Canyon's 
protest of the use tax. IdL 
SLCl-48140 1 33714-0001 2 
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9. On July 15, 1991,1 wrote to advise Grand Canyon of the status of the Notice of 
Protest. See Letter of Ann M. Dumenil to Michael R. Denoyer, July 15, 1991 (attached to 
Grand Canyon's Supporting Memorandum as Exhibit "J."). 
10. In my July 15 letter, I told Grand Canyon that although it was possible that 
some river rafting company might successfully challenge the transaction privilege tax in 
Arizona, such a challenge would take years to resolve. Moreover, I explained that ADOR was 
taking the position that since the costs of the tax were passed on to Grand Canyon's customers, 
the refund would not be made to Grand Canyon, even if Grand Canyon were technically 
entitled to such a refund. Id^  
11. I asked if Grand Canyon desired to continue litigating the question of the 
transaction privilege tax as it would involve significant time, expense and risk. Id^  
12. On August 21, 1991, Mr. Denoyer called me to say that Grand Canyon did not 
want to continue litigating the transaction privilege issue. 
13. Pursuant to Grand Canyon's instruction, I allowed their request to lapse; I did 
not formally withdraw Grand Canyon's request, however, because I thought another rafting 
company might someday successfully challenge the transaction privilege tax; consequently, I 
believed that leaving Grand Canyon's request pending would be beneficial to Grand Canyon 
because they might be able to argue that they were entitled to a refund. 
14. I did not specifically advise Grand Canyon that I had not formally withdrawn its 
refund request until August 20, 1992, when I sent a letter to Mr. Denoyer explaining my 
decision and its rationale. I also advised Mr. Denoyer that a hearing had been scheduled on 
the request for refund of the transaction privilege tax. Letter of Ann M. Dumenil to Michael 
SLCl-48140.1 33714-0001 3 
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R. Denoyer, August 20, 1992 (attached to Grand Canyon's Supporting Memorandum as 
Exhibit "K.") 
15. In my August 20, 1992 letter I explained to Grand Canyon that I did not believe 
it was likely to prevail on this issue, and asked again whether Grand Canyon wanted to pursue 
the matter. IdL 
16. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Denoyer told me that Grand Canyon did not wish to 
pursue the request for a refund of transaction privilege taxes and asked me to withdraw Grand 
Canyon's request. 
17. I again made the determination that it was in Grand Canyon's best interest not to 
formally withdraw the request, but rather merely to cancel its hearing and wait to see if 
another company successfully challenged the tax. Accordingly, I canceled the hearing on 
Grand Canyon's request for refund, although I did not specifically explain this to Grand 
Canyon at the time. <ke Handwritten Notes on Memorandum of August 25, 1992 (attached to 
Grand Canyon's Supporting Memorandum as Exhibit "L."). 
18. The transaction privilege tax was subsequently challenged successfully by a 
another river rafting company in an appeal before the Arizona Supreme Court reported as 
Wilderness World. Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 108 (Ariz. 1995). 
19. On September 13, 1995, I sent Grand Canyon a copy of my 1992 memo 
(Exhibit "0") to file memorializing a call from Mike Denoyer in which he said he did not want 
to pursue any refund claim. 
SLCl-48140.1 33714-0001 4 
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20. I wrote on this memo a note indicating that it was fortuitous that I did not 
withdraw the refund claim, but had only canceled Grand Canyon's hearing on the matter, since 
that left Grand Canyon eligible for a refund. See Supp. Mem. Ex. "L." 
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DATED this otC> day of March, 1999. 
LJ/HM<mwjm(i/YuA 
Ann M. Dumenil 
UL 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me t h i s ^ _ day of March, 1999. 
2 -^ 
Notary PuW ^ 
Residing at: Jfci E Ac*/? \ t ft-a ^ C - U 
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RECEIVED 
APR 1 5 2000 
STiRBA 4 HATHAWAY 
DISTRICT COURT, KANE COUNTY, UTAH 
76 North Main 
Kanab 
Telephone: (435) 644-2458 Fax: (435) 644-2052 
°0u$«* 
MARC SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO ; 
MARTIN MATfflS; MICHAEL DENOYER; 
DONALD SAUNDERS;, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 940600003 
Assigned Judge: K. L. McIFF 
This matter is before the Court on the following motions. 
1- Defendants'motion for summary judgment; 
2- Defendants' motion to exclude testimony of plaintiffs expert, 
3- Plaintiffs motion for leave to amend. 
Each motion has been extensively briefed and argued. After careful consideration, the 
Court has determined to deny each of the motions; however, in so doing the Court has narrowed 
the areas which remain viable and concerning which proof will be permitted. The reasoning 
behind the Court's decision is briefly summarized hereafter, though no effort has been made to 
cite legal authority for well-established principles. The exhaustive briefing has supplied more than 
ample authority for the Court's conclusions of law. Rather the Court has focused on sharing with 
the parties its view of the issues with which the jury will be obliged to grapple. 
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I begin by noting that plaintiff was forced out of a closely held corporation. There were 
five shareholders. Plaintiff owned 17.66% of the outstanding stock. Under the buy/sell 
agreement entered into at inception, three of the shareholders, including plaintiff, were obliged to 
sell their stock upon termination of employment, whether voluntary or involuntary. At the time of 
his involuntary termination, a buyout agreement was reduced to writing and signed by plaintiff 
and the corporate president. In reliance on this agreement the Court previously granted partial 
summary judgment, dismissing the plaintiffs claim of an entitlement to continued employment. 
This ruling left only plaintiffs claimed breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. With 
respect to this claim, the Court stated: 
The duty of good faith and fair dealing applies not only to the original agreements between 
these parties, but would have extended to the termination proceedings and the manner of 
accounting and fixing values. And this is so even though the buy-sell agreement accorded 
'conclusive status' to the value determined by the accountant. The conclusive status of 
these values necessarily presumes the absence of a breach of the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing. 
After revisiting all the pleadings, including the extensive briefing and massive amount of 
supporting material filed of late, the Court remains convinced that the statement above quoted 
essentially outlines the proper areas for trial. An effort has been made hereafter to add sufficient 
substance and detail so that the parties may know how to proceed. 
It is the Court's considered view that the duty of good faith and fair dealing has both 
negative and affirmative components. The former prevents the doing of anything in bad faith or 
with intent to injure. The latter, in the right circumstances, may require affirmative acts which are 
1720 
MEMORANDUM DECISION, Case number 940600003, Page 3 -
reasonable and faithful to an agreed common purpose and consistent with justified expectations. I 
consider this view to be supported by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF CONTRACTS 
which has been adopted by Utah Courts. It is not a sufficient defense that defendant's did not 
intentionally injure plaintiff or intentionally engage in acts of bad faith. 
With the foregoing in mind, I will proceed to examine the potential application of the 
doctrine requiring good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff asserts that in the beginning the corporate 
accountant used inappropriate accounting procedures which at the time of the buyout unfairly 
compromised the value of his stock. A major difficulty with this position is that the accounting 
method in question was developed when no dispute existed between the parties. It was employed 
for some six years before a dispute arose. The benefits and burdens of the approach have been 
enjoyed by all participants and there has been no evidence proffered to the effect that it was 
inconsistent with their contemporaneous common purposes or reasonable expectations. 
Moreover, the evidence before the Court supports the conclusion that in the absence of 
competing positions the accounting procedures were within the broad range of what might be 
considered "generally accepted accounting procedures". This early part of the business 
relationship between the parties is a closed chapter. 
The foregoing reasoning does not apply with equal force to the accounting procedures 
employed at or around the time of the buyout when the relationship had ruptured. Plaintiff has 
challenged the handling of some matters at this time, including the corporation's accounting 
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methodology in acquisition of another business. Some of the potential disputes in this area may 
evaporate in the light of further examination of relevant information by the parties and their 
accountants, but to the extent that a dispute remains, it is the proper subject of inquiry at trial. 
Once the rupture occurred and the buyout triggered, the natural loyalty of the corporate 
accountant (as opposed to the broader duty owed all shareholders) would have run to defendants. 
Plaintiff would have been viewed as an outsider. The relationship was adversarial. This is not 
analogous to the situation six years earlier when all parties were essentially in the same boat. I 
conclude, therefore, that plaintiffs expert is entitled to address the appropriateness of accounting 
procedures employed at or near the time of the buyout when the parties were at odds. At that 
time it may not be a complete defense that the methodology employed comports with "generally 
accepted accounting principles". In briefing and at oral argument, both sides agreed that the 
inherent flexibility in accounting principles make them analogous to a line rather than a dot on a 
line. The duty of good faith and fair dealing may well influence the acceptable position on the line 
consistent with the reasonable expectations of the parties. 
I turn now to the matter of the Arizona tax refund. The salient facts are these. The tax 
was collected from third persons. It was collected in its entirety and paid to the State of Arizona 
while plaintiff was a shareholder. It came back to the corporation in 1995 and 1996 some three 
plus years after plaintiffs departure. Plaintiff did not become aware of the refund until 1998 and 
the extent of the refund was not disclosed to him until some time in 1999. The dollar figures are 
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revealing. Plaintiff was forced to sell his stock based upon a net book value for the entire 
corporation of some $730,000. The tax refund relating entirely to the time covered by plaintiffs 
ownership was approximately $1,000,000. Of the one million dollars received, defendants were 
theoretically required to return $280,000 to the original payers, but apparently this has proved at 
least somewhat impossible. The bottom line is that the corporate defendant received and 
distributed to its then existing shareholders an amount which exceeds the total value of the 
corporation which was employed to compute the value of the plaintiffs stock in the forced 
buyout.1 
It is my considered view that a jury could reasonably conclude that there is a lack of equity 
and fairness in the scenario outlined and that it violates what the parties could have reasonably 
expected from each other. The two suggested remedies are unjust enrichment and breach of the 
duty of good faith and fair dealing. Defendants claim plaintiff cannot prove the essential elements 
of a claim of unjust enrichment. Specifically, they argue that plaintiff has not conferred any 
benefit on defendant; rather the benefit was conferred by third parties to whom a refund is either 
not required or impractical. Defendants freely acknowledge the windfall, but claim plaintiff is not 
entitled to any credit. Rather than get in that quagmire, the Court has determined that the better 
remedy is to allow the jury to consider whether plaintiff has a reasonable expectation of 
participation based on the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Equity and justice are as central to 
1
 Some monies may still be held in a retained earmngs account, but this will likely not change the 
ultimate economics or equities. 
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this claim as they are to a claim of unjust enrichment. The defense claims that the duty of good 
faith and fair dealing is unavailable because there is no evidence of an intent to injure and no 
evidence of bad faith conduct. The Court views this as an excessively narrow construction of the 
duty; and of equal importance, the Court believes defendants have disregarded important facts 
surrounding the preservation of and ultimate recovery under the claim against the State of 
Arizona. 
More specifically, defendants' claim that when the corporate president signed the buyout 
agreement with plaintiff, he was unaware that the tax refund claim was still viable. The president 
had directed counsel to dismiss the claim, but this direction was disobeyed. The corporation 
seeks to insulate itself against a claimed breach of good faith by drawing a line between corporate 
officials and the attorney whom the corporation had retained to represent its interest in the State 
of Arizona. The line is too fine for this Court. Based upon the affidavit of the Arizona attorney, 
it appears clear that the potential of obtaining a tax refund was deliberately kept open from 
August 1991 through the buyout of plaintiffs stock in July of 1992, and on through 1995 and 
1996 when the tax refund ultimately came. The attorney's affidavit indicates that she declined to 
follow the directive of the corporate president to withdraw the request, opting instead to simply 
cancel hearings, thereby leaving the request intact. She states unequivocally that she deliberately 
made these decisions believing that it was in the best interest of the corporation and that it might 
ultimately be able to obtain a refund. The Court is unwilling to allow the defendant to draw a line 
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between corporate officials and the corporate attorney when answering plaintiffs claim, while at 
the same time holding on to the benefits derived from the course deliberately pursued by the 
attorney. 
At oral argument defendants suggested that they may have been entitled to receive the 
refund even if the attorney would not have disobeyed directions and kept the claim alive. The 
Court does not consider that controlling.2 The fact remains that the corporate attorney, by 
conscious design, kept alive a claim which ultimately resulted in recovery of an amount exceeding 
the entire remaining value of the corporation. This overlapped the period of the buyout and was 
not disclosed to the plaintiff in any manner. Moreover, if the facts are as the defendants allege, to 
wit, the corporate officials were also in the dark, then all of the parties (save only the attorney) 
were negotiating without full knowledge of the facts at the time of the buyout. This posture 
continued until near the time the refund was received. After that, it was only the plaintiff that 
remained in the dark, a posture which continued until the latter stages of this litigation. If the 
knowledge of the attorney is imputable to the corporate president, then there was a unilateral 
mistake of fact on plaintiffs part coupled with "sharp practices" by the other negotiating party. If 
the knowledge is not imputable, then there was a mutual mistake by the negotiating parities. 
2
 Apparently the Arizona legislature granted relief to the "river running" companies, including the 
defendant Grand Canyon Expeditions (GCE). Presumably there were enough companies similarly situated to urge 
successful passages of favorable legislation. GCE may not have been active and it may not have tipped the scales, 
but it would be indefensibly speculative to assume that it or any other similarly situated player was irrelevant to the 
outcome. The old saying applies: "There is strength in numbers." 
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Either way, a jury could well conclude that there has been a breach of the duty of good faith and 
fair dealing. This, it has been held, is a factual inquiry generally inappropriate for decisions as a 
matter of law. 
I address one other matter relating to expert testimony. The parties argued at length as to 
how the corporate accountant should have treated the tax refund; whether it should be labeled a 
"prior period adjustment" or simply considered income for the period in which it was received.3 I 
do not consider this to be the controlling issue. The duty of good faith and fair dealing has more 
to do with the reasonable expectations of the parties than it does with accounting procedures. 
Defendants ask the rhetorical question, "What if there would have been a tax liability, would there 
have been an expectation of liability on plaintiffs part?" Defendants will have to pitch that 
question to the jury. It is more in the nature of argument. It has to do with reasonable 
expectations which are the focal point of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
Finally, the individual defendants ask for dismissal of the claims as against them. It was 
established at oral argument that the corporate defendant is a subchapter S, closely held, 
corporation and that virtually all of the refund monies have been distributed to the small group of 
shareholders who are the remaining defendants. Given these facts, the Court declines to dismiss 
the claim against the individual defendants. 
Govern yourselves accordingly. 
The accountant apparently treated it as "retained earnings". What can be made of that, if anything, 
remains to be seen. 
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Dated this CZLJ day of March, 2000. 
K. L. McIFF 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
On March ,Q,Q , 2000 a copy of the above MEMORANDUM DECISION was sent to 
each of the following by the method indicated: 
Addressee Method (M^mail, P=in person, F=Fax) Addressee Method (M=mail, P=in person, F=Fax) 
Mr. John A. Anderson [m] Mr. Benson Hathaway [m] 
STOEL RIVES STERBA & HATHAWAY 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1100 215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
7;^uJ' /^Xxss-k y 
!/' 
H:\home\coMMON\jMciFF\KANE\5m1thmemo.dec 
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John A. Anderson (4464) 
Matthew M. Durham (6214) 
201 Main Street, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-3131 
Attorneys for Defendants 
IN THE SDCTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARC SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS 
CO., MARTIN MATHIS; MICHAEL 
DENOYER; DONALD SAUNDERS; 
JOHN DOES 1 through 5; and JANE 
DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF KANE ) 
Nyle W. Willis, having been first sworn, deposes and states: 
1. I am a resident of Kane County, Utah, over the age of majority, and 
otherwise competent to make this affidavit. 
2. I am a certified public accountant duly licensed to practice in the State 
SLCl-48002.1 337144001 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
NYLE W. WILLIS 
Civil No. 940600003 
Hon. K. L. Mclff 
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under the heading "Grand Canyon" set forth the balance sheet as it appeared on the Concession 
Report for Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. for 1991. The next two columns under the heading 
u
 White Water" set forth the balance sheet as it appeared on the Concession Report for White 
Water for the period of October 1, 1991 to December 31, 1991. The third two columns under 
the heading "Combined Balance Sheet" set forth the totals of each of the line items as they 
would have appeared had the financial reports been presented for the combined companies. It 
was necessary to eliminate the $1,200,000 representing "Investment in White Water" (Exhibit 
"F" at line 17) from the asset side of Grand Canyon Expeditions Co.'s balance sheet and the 
$1,200,000 representing "Partner's or Proprietor's Capital" (Exhibit "G" at line 33) from the 
equity in the White Water balance sheet because the assets, liabilities and earnings are already 
included when the two balance sheets are combined. Including the $1,200,000 overstates the 
equity by that amount. The correct equity for Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. combined with 
White Water as of December 31, 1991 is the total of capital stock of $74,720, additional paid-
in capital of $299,382 and retained earnings of $399,342 for a total of $773,444, which 
represents the net book value of Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. as of December 31, 1991. 
This net book value is reflected in both Exhibit "H" (titled "TOTAL CAPITAL") and Exhibit 
"I" (lines 22-24). 
16. Attached as Exhibit "J" is a photocopy of the balance sheet portion of 
the corporate income tax return filed for Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. for the year ended 
1991. The total net book value is consistent with the above, that is $773,445 (see lines 22-24). 
17. At no time has any officer, director, or shareholder of Grand Canyon 
engaged in acts or omissions to manipulate the financial status of Grand Canyon, nor have they 
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made any attempt to reduce Marc Smith's proportionate share of the company or reduce the 
purchase price of his stock at the time Grand Canyon Expedition Co. purchased it. 
18. Grand Canyon Expedition Co.'s 1991 year-end financial statements and 
accounting records were prepared several months before Marc Smith's separation from 
employment. 
19. At the time I prepared the 1991 year-end financial statements and 
accounting records for Grand Canyon Expedition Co., I was unaware of any possibility that 
Marc Smith would leave the company's employ, or that Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. would 
purchase Marc Smith's stock in Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. 
20. I was not contacted by anyone concerning Marc Smith's separation 
from employment at Grand Canyon until July 1992, shortly before the separation occurred; at 
that time, I was contacted by Dick Skeen, Grand Canyon Expeditions Co.'s attorney who 
requested that I calculate the net book value as described in the Buy-Sell Agreement. 
21. Prior to that time, I never discussed Marc Smith's separation from 
employment at Grand Canyon Expedition Co. with anyone. 
DATED this day of March, 1999. 
Nyle W. Willis 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this day of March, 
1999. 
Notary Public 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * 
MARC SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO., 
MARTIN MATHIS; MICHAEL 
DENOYER, RONALD R. SMITH; 
DONALD SAUNDERS, JOHN DOES 1 
through 5 and JANE DOES 1 
through 5, 
Defendants. 
DEPOSITION OF 
NYLE WILLIAM WILLIS 
Civil No. 940600003 
BE IT REMEMBERED, that on Tuesday, the 10th day of 
October, 1995, the deposition of NYLE WILLIAM WILLIS, 
produced as a witness at the instance of the plaintiff 
pursuant to written notice and subpoena in the above-
captioned matter now pending in the above-entitled Court, 
was taken before me, Byron Ray Christiansen, a Notary Public 
and Certified Shorthand Reporter in and for the State of 
Utah, commencing at the hour of 9:00 a.m. of said day, at 
the Kane County Courthouse, 76 South Main, Kanab, Utah 
84741. 
B Y R O N RAY C H R I S T I A N S E N . JR. 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND RCPOHTKR ( 8 0 1 ) 6 7 3 - 5 1 0 0 1 
we'll go from there. 
Did you know, Mr. Willis, at the time the Sobek company 
was acquired, that there was just one year left before the 
contract — the Sobek contract expired? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. And you testified earlier that your 
understanding was usually those contracts — concession 
contract rights and the right of preference with them that 
made them valuable were amortized over their life — over 
the remaining life of the contract before it was to expire 
and had to be renewed, is that correct? 
A. That they were amortized over that length of time? 
Q. Usually they were amortized that way? 
A. Like I say, this is a unique company with a unique 
situation. I don't know if they — what they are normally 
done; this is the only client I have that has one of these 
things. 
Q. All right. Well, I guess what I'm coming back to, 
then, is — you say — you know, I got completely lost when 
I forgot your answer to "I assume so," and I lost my train 
of thought. 
But I was asking you, was I not, how it was determined 
to amortize the Sobek $500,000 Contract Right of Preference 
over — you know, what the amortization period would be. 
And you said you assumed it was five years, is that correct? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2
 Q. Maybe that's what I was asking you. What did you 
3
 base that assumption on? 
4
 A. Tax law. 
5
 Q. Okay. And it was — was it you that set that up 
6
 that way or was it pursuant to instructions from Mr. 
7
 Saunders or his accountants in Washington? 
B
 A. No, we didn't have any contact with the 
9
 accountants in Washington. 
10
 Q. Okay. 
11
 A* So I set it up that way, I assume. 
12
 Q* Hypothetically# if the million dollars, that 
!3 represented the covenant not to compete when Saunders bought 
14
 the company from Ron Smith, was set up as a Contract Right 
15
 of Preference or a concession contract, in your mind, it 
16
 would have been amortized off over the remaining life of the 
17
 contract until it expired with the National Park Service? 
18
 MR. ANDERSON: Objection. Incomplete 
19
 hypothetical, calls for speculation. 
2
° Q. (By Mr. Paxton) Would that have been — but for 
21
 the covenant not to compete, had the million dollars, that 
22 was assigned to the covenant not to compete in the Ron Smith 
23 and Don Saunders deal, been allocated to the contract right, 
24 the concession contract and its right of preference, over 
25 what period of time would you have amortized that on the 
BYRON RAY CHRISTIANSEN. JR. 
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1 ballpark it, or what? 
2
 A. No. I think it had to do with the fair market 
3
 value that we had established on some of those assets in the 
4
 dissolution of Ronald R. Smith Company. 
5
 Q. Okay. Any other ways? 
6
 A. I don't remember. 
7
 Q. Okay. Is it fair to say, then, Mr. Willis, that 
B
 Exhibit No. 35, the Financial Statements you've prepared for 
9
 the company throughout these years — these year-end 
10
 statements were kept for tax purposes rather than according 
11
 to GAP as such? 
12
 A. Yes. 
13
 Q. Are the assets being depreciated according to GAP 
14
 in all cases, as reflected in 35, the method of 
15
 depreciation? 
16
 A. GAP will accept IRS depreciation in most cases, 
17
 but the decisions on how to depreciate the assets was made 
1B
 with the tax law in mind, not with GAP in mind. 
19
 Q. And would that be the same answer for the way the 
20 amortization — the intangibles has been handled? 
21
 A. Yes. 
2 2
 Q. Let me show you what we've marked as Deposition 
23 Exhibit No. 36, which is comprised of six pages, and ask you 
2
* if you ever recall seeing that document before. Let me just 
25 represent — state on the record, that these were documents 
B Y R O N RAY CHRIST IANSEN. 
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AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT by and between MARC SMITH ("Smith-
hereafter) and GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO. , a Otah corporation 
("Corporation11 hereafter), is made in consideration of the mutual 
promises and covenants of the parties as follows: 
1. Smith is a shareholder of the Corporation, owning 
Certificate No. 4 representing 4,250 shares and Certificate No, 9 
representing 2, 348 shares, a total of 6,598 shares ("Shares" 
hereafter). 
2. The ownership and disposition of the Shares are 
subject to the terms and conditions of a Buy-Sell Agreement dated 
November 29, 198 6 by and among all of the shareholders of the 
Corporation ("Buy-Sell Agreement* hereafter, a copy of which is 
attached as Exhibit "A"). 
3. Smith is an employee of the Corporation, having 
executed an Employment Agreement dated November 29th, 1986; is 
Vice President of the Corporation and is a member of the Board of 
Directors. 
4. Pursuant to the provisions of the Buy-Sell 
Agreement Smith hereby sells, assigns and transfers all of his 
right, title and interest in and to the Shares owned by him for a 
total purchase price of One Hundred Eighty Thousand Six Hundred 
Thirty-Nine Dollars and Thirty-Seven Cents ($180,639.37). The 
purchase price has been determined in accordance with the terms 
of the Buy-Sell Agreement based upon One Hundred Forty percent 
(140%) of the Corporation's net book value as of June 30, 1992. 
5. The purchase price shall be paid as follows: 
a. $69,6 90. 00 shall be paid by the Corporation 
at Closing by check payable to Donald A. Saunders and Marc Smith 
representing the amounts due from Marc Smith to Donald A. 
Saunders as provided in the following-described Notes: 
i. Note dated November 19, 1986 in the 
amount of $42,500. 00. 
ii. Note dated September 30, 1991 in the 
amount of $23,484.00. 
iii. Interest on the above-described notes 
from January 1, 1991 to July 25, 1992 in the amount of 
$3,710.00. 
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Upon receipt of the above check, Smith shall endorse it to Donald 
A. Saunders which shall constitute payment in full of all amounts 
owed by Smith to Donald A. Saunders in connection with the above 
notes, and said notes shall be canceled. 
b. The balance of the purchase price in the 
amount of $110,949,37 shall be evidenced by a Promissory Note in 
the form attached to this Agreement as Exhibit "A* which shall be 
executed by the Corporation, The promissory note shall provide 
for payment in equal monthly installments payable over a period 
of six years at ten percent (10%) interest per annum. The first 
monthly installment shall be due on August 25th, 1992 and such 
monthly installments shall be payable on the 25th day of each 
month thereafter until principal and interest has been paid in 
full. All payments shall first be credited to interest and the 
balance to principal. Any time after the first monthly 
installment, the holder of the note may demand payment in full. 
Corporation shall make payment of the then unpaid balance within 
15 days after receipt of a written demand for payment in full. 
Corporation shall not have the right to prepay any monthly 
payment. 
6. In addition to the payments provided above, and in 
lieu of any other amounts or benefits which may be due from the 
Corporation as provided in the Employment Agreement or otherwise, 
including but not limited to bonus, additional salary, 
commissions and health benefits, the Corporation shall pay Smith 
the sum of Thirty-Seven Thousand Nine Hundred Forty Dollars and 
Eighty-Eight Cents ($37,940.88) which represents severance pay. 
The severence pay is subject to withholding taxes. 
7. Smith shall resign as an officer and employee of 
the Corporation effective July 15, 1992 and shall execute a 
resignation letter in the form attached as Exhibit "C". 
8. The closing for the transaction described in this 
Agreement shall be July 25, 1992 at the offices of the 
Corporation in Kanab, Utah- At the Closing the parties shall 
deliver and perform the following: 
a. Corporation. 
i. Deliver a check payable to Marc Smith 
and Donald A. Saunders in the amount of $69, 690. 00. 
ii. Deliver a check to Marc Smith for 
severance pay less taxes required to be withheld as 
described in paragraph 6. The amount of the check 
-2-
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shall be determined by deducting the applicable tax 
withholdings from the gross severance pay of 
$37, 940. 88. 
iii. Deliver a Promissory Note in the form 
of Exhibit "B" in the face amount of $110, 949, 37 in 
. favor of Marc Smith and executed by the Corporation* 
b. Smith, 
i. Smith shall endorse the check payable to 
Marc Smith and Donald A. Saunders in the amount of 
$69, 690. 00 to Donald A. Saunders and deliver it to the 
Corporation at Closing. 
ii. Deliver Certificate No. 4 for 4,250 
shares of Corporation stock and Certificate No. 9 for 
2, 348 shares of Corporation stock to the Corporation. 
The certificates shall be endorsed on the back by Marc 
Smith. 
c. The Corporation shall deliver the check in 
the amount of $6 9,6 90.00 to Donald A. Saunders in exchange for 
the Promissory Notes executed by Marc Smith, on November 29, 1986 
in the amount of $42,500.00, and on September 30, 1991 in the 
amount of $23,484.00. Said Notes shall be marked upaid in full" 
by Donald A. Saunders and returned to Marc Smith. 
9. The Corporation hereby waives any right to enforce 
the provisions of the covenant not to compete set out in 
paragraph II. 2 " Non-Competition" of the Employment Agreement 
executed by Smith on November 29, 1986 in favor of the 
Corporation; provided, however, that Marc Smith shall not 
disclose confidential information regarding the business of the 
Corporation acquired during his employment including but not 
limited to trade secrets belonging to Corporation or solicit 
customers of the Corporation or use or in any way disclose to 
others mailing lists or lists of past or present customers of the 
Corporation. 
10. Smith represents and warrants that there are no 
liens or other encumbrance against any of the Corporation stock 
certificates owned by him except for the lien in favor of Donald 
A. Saunders and that no other person or entity can claim or has 
any interest in and to those certificates and that Smith has the 
right to transfer the Shares as contemplated by this Agreement. 
-3-
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11. This Agreement embodies the entire agreement 
between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter 
hereof and there are no agreements, warranties or representations 
between the parties other than those set forth and as provided 
herein. 
12. This Agreement and each provision thereof shall be 
binding upon and inure to the benefit of the Corporation and 
Smith and their respective successors, heirs, personal 
representatives or assigns. 
13. This agreement shall be construed in accordance 
with the laws of the State of Utah. 
DATED this 25th day of July, 1992. 
CORPORATION: 
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS COMPANY 
Michael Denoyer, President 
SMITH: 
B^ 
Mai-c Smith 
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BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR. (Bar No. 4138) 
RICHARD J. ARMSTRONG (Bar No. 7461) 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-8300 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARC SMITH, 
Plaintiff, AFFIDAVIT OF 
DERK G. RASMUSSEN 
v. : 
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS : 
CO., MARTIN MATHIS, MICHAEL 
DENOYER, RONALD R. SMITH, Civil No. 940600003 
DONALD SAUNDERS, JOHN DOES 
1 through 5 and JANE DOES 1 Judge Kay McKiff 
through 5, 
Defendants. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Derk G. Rasmussen, being first duly sworn, hereby deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am a resident of Davis County, Utah, over the age of majority, and am otherwise 
competent to make this affidavit. 
1012 
2. I am a Certified Public Accountant by the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants; a Certified Fraud Examiner by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners; and I am 
Accredited in Business Valuations by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants. I have 
been practicing in the profession of accounting for the past 16 years. 
3. I have received several financial records of Grand Canyon produced by it pursuant to 
Plaintiffs discovery requests in preparation of this AflSdavit. I note that the financial statement for 
October 1991 a month critical to the analysis of the Whitewater/Sobek transaction was not produced. 
4. In his March , 1999 affidavit, Nyle Willis states in paragraph 5, what the records 
of Grand Canyon Expedition Company, "Grand Canyon", reflect the net book value to be for the 
years of 1986 through 1992. Based on my review of the financial statements, tax returns and Annual 
Concessioners Reports prepared by Mr. Willis on behalf of Grand Canyon, and as set forth more 
precisely herein below, the net book value entered for Grand Canyon for the years of 1986 through 
1992 is substantially less than the net book value should have been according to generally accepted 
accounting principles and their reasonable application, especially in light of the provision in the 
subject Buy-Sell Agreement fixing outgoing shareholders' stock forced sales price to Grand Canyon's 
"net book value". 
5. In paragraphs 6 through IS of his affidavit, Mr. Willis explains how he eliminated 
$ 1,200,000 representing "partners or proprietors capital" from the combined financial statements of 
Whitewater/Sobek and Grand Canyon. While I do not have any dispute in theory with Mr. Willis' 
elimination of the $ 1,200,000 "partners or proprietors capital" from the combined financial statement, 
as set forth more fully in paragraph 6|.b. below, Mr. Willis, Grand Canyon, and its officers and 
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directors, recorded a value of the assets acquired through the Whitewater/Sobek acquisition $229,304 
less than the $1,200,000 purchase price. This was accomplished by Grand Canyon and Mr. Willis 
adjusting the $1.2 million dollar purchase price by deducting a negative retained earnings in the 
amount of $229,304. This accounting treatment of Whitewater and Grand Canyon's books upon the 
consolidation of the financial statements is best reflected in Mr. Willis' reconciliation prepared and 
attached as Exhibit "D" to Grand Canyon's Memorandum in Support of its Supplemental Motion for 
Summary Judgment, and effectively decreases the net book value of Grand Canyon as of January 1, 
1992 by $229,304. 
6. In Mr. Willis* paragraph 16, he states that the net book value of the combined Grand 
Canyon/Whitewater/Sobek enterprise as of December 31,1991 was $773,445. It appears to me that 
the net book value for the end of that year should at least be adjusted by $229,304 as set forth in 
paragraph 5 above, and in addition, bears a substantial adjustment in accordance with the other 
accounting applications set forth below in paragraph 7. 
7. In his affidavit paragraph 17, Mr. Willis states that iCNo officer, director, or 
shareholder of Grand Canyon engaged in acts or omissions to manipulate the financial status of Grand 
Canyon, nor have they made any attempt to reduce Marc Smith's proportioned share of the company 
or reduced the purchase price of the stock at the time Grand Canyon Expedition Company purchased 
it." See Willis Affidavit, f^ 17. Upon review of Grand Canyon's financial records, in my opinion, Mr. 
Willis' statement is false in the following particulars: 
a. When Grand Canyon acquired the river running business assets from Ron 
Smith in 1986, Mr. Willis, ostensibly under the direction of the officers and directors of Grand 
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Canyon, accounted for the assets acquired and included them on the books of Grand Canyon. 
In my opinion, Mr. Willis and the officers and directors of Grand Canyon did not comply with 
generally accepted accounting principles and unreasonably accounted for the purchased assets 
on the financial statements of Grand Canyon. 
Grand Canyon paid Ron Smith $2,147,000 for the assets. Approximately $ 1,047,000 
of the purchase price was allocated to physical assets such as equipment, land and buildings. 
$100,000 of the purchase price was allocated to good will and $1,000,000 of the purchase 
price was allocated to a covenant not to compete granted to Grand Canyon by Ron Smith. 
A copy of the Grand Canyon/Ron Smith purchase agreement is attached to Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition as Exhibit "D" and made a part hereof. Generally accepted 
accounting principles require that when a company acquires a business by purchasing assets, 
the assets should be placed on the balance sheet of the acquiring company at fair value. In 
other words, the purchase price of the business assets is included on the balance sheet of the 
acquiring company by allocating the purchase price to identifiable acquired assets based on 
each asset's fair value. Generally accepted accounting principles also require a prioritization 
of how the assets are to be allocated. The purchase price is first allocated to all physical 
assets acquired such as land, buildings, and equipment. If the purchase price exceeds the fair 
value of the physical assets, the remaining amount is required by generally accepted 
accounting principles to be allocated to intangible assets such as good will, permits and 
covenants not to compete. The process of allocating purchase price to intangible assets is the 
same as the allocation process for physical or tangible assets, that is, their fair value. To 
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comply with generally acceptable accounting principles, each identifiable, intangible asset 
needs to have its fair value determined so that an appropriate amount of the purchase price 
can be allocated to that asset. In this case, Mr. Willis and the officers and directors of Grand 
Canyon erred when they simply recorded $1,000,000 on the books of Grand Canyon 
attributable to Ron Smith's covenant not to compete, without first making a determination 
of the covenant's fair value. Generally accepted accounting principles require that a 
transaction be recorded based on its substance, rather than its form. In my opinion, Ron 
Smith's covenant not to compete was virtually worthless and therefore little, if any, of the 
purchase price should have been allocated to it. My reasons follow: 
(1) Ron Smith sold all of his permits to operate river trips on the Colorado River 
through the Grand Canyon to Grand Canyon as part of the 1986 transaction. It was 
illegal to run commercial river trips through the Grand Canyon without a permit. In 
1986, new permits were not being issued by the federal government; 
(2) Ron Smith was about 45 years old at the time of the sale when he signed the 
covenant not to compete and expressed his intentions to all concerned that it was his 
purpose to get out of the business and "go fishing" see Ron Smith's Deposition, 
216:15-216:2, attached to Plaintiffs Memorandum as Exhibit "K" and made a part 
hereof; 
(3) Marc Smith, not Ron, had been running the business for several years before Ron 
sold his assets to Grand Canyon. See Don Saunders Deposition 33:14 to 34:12, 
attached to Plaintiffs Memorandum as Exhibit T ' and made a part hereof; and, 
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(4) Ron Smith remained a 10 percent shareholder of Grand Canyon and agreed to 
consult with Grand Canyon as necessary and was paid a salary for that purpose. See 
November 29, 1986 Purchase Agreement % 2, 3 and 24, Exhibit D. 
I found no analysis of the fair value of Ron Smith's covenant not to compete 
performed by Mr. Willis or any officer or director of Grand Canyon. It is my opinion, 
therefore, that neither Mr. Willis nor any officer or director of Grand Canyon followed 
generally accepted accounting principles when they booked Ron Smith's covenant not to 
compete at $1,000,000. 
I recognize in 1986 Grand Canyon had a tax incentive to record as much of the 
purchase price as possible to the covenant not to compete. At that time, the tax laws allowed 
a company to write off a covenant not to compete over the life of the covenant. Indeed, 
Grand Canyon wrote off Ron Smith's covenant not to compete within four years of its 
acquisition, reflecting an annual write-off of $250,000, which came directly off the net book 
value. While this might have been good tax planning, it was not in compliance with generally 
accepted accounting principles. 
At the same time Mr. Willis recorded a $1,000,000 value for Ron Smith's covenant 
not to compete on the books of Grand Canyon, he completely ignores the most valuable asset 
acquired by Grand Canyon in the Ron Smith asset acquisition. The U.S. Forest Service 
permits to operate river trips through the Grand Canyon are the most valuable assets acquired 
by Grand Canyon. Without those, Grand Canyon cannot operate in the Grand Canyon. In 
Mr. Willis' 1986 accounting, no mention is made of the permits or their value on the books 
and records of Grand Canyon. (In 1993 the tax laws were changed to require the 
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amortization of all intangible assets, including covenants not to compete, over IS years. This 
tax law change virtually eliminated the tax planning employed by Mr. Willis and the officers 
and directors of Grand Canyon in 1986.) It is worth noting that when Grand Canyon 
acquired the Whitewater/Sobek assets in 1991, most of the intangible value was recorded by 
Mr. Willis and the officers and directors of Grand Canyon, as it should have been in 1986, to 
the U.S. Forest Service permits. Indeed the permits are the only asset of Whitewater/Sobek 
that had any value to Grand Canyon. A copy of a letter from Mike Denoyer to Don Saunders 
discussing the Whitewater deal, which was produced by Defendants in discovery, is attached 
to Plaintiffs Memorandum as Exhibit "F' and made a part hereof. In my opinion, in order 
for its financial statements to comply with generally accepted accounting principles, Mr. Willis 
and the officers and directors of Grand Canyon should have allocated the $1,000,000 
attributed to Ron Smith's covenant not to compete, to the U.S. Forest Service permits, and 
perhaps some small amount to the covenant not to compete and good will Had Mr. Willis 
and the officers and directors of Grand Canyon recorded the value of the permits at their fan-
value, the net book of Grand Canyon would have been significantly different on July 31,1992 
when Marc Smith's stock was redeemed. 
As generally accepted accounting principles require the amortization of intangible 
assets over their useful lives, the life of the permits and good will is certainly greater than four 
years (the amortization period used to write off Ron Smith's covenant not to compete.) By 
way of comparison, Grand Canyon amortized the $100,000 allocated to good will recorded 
at its acquisition of Ron Smith's assets to the limited extent that as of July 31, 1992, none of 
the $100,000 allocated toward good will had been amortized at all. 
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It is my opinion that the amortization of Ron Smith's permits acquired by Grand 
Canyon should have been the maximum allowable period under the generally accepted 
accounting principles, or 40 years. The permits Grand Canyon acquired from Ron Smith are 
now approximately 35 years old and still have a far-reaching useful life. For all intents and 
purposes, it seems the permits will continue in perpetuity. 
If Mr. Willis and the officers and directors of Grand Canyon had properly booked 
$1,000,000 of the purchase price toward the forest service permits, and amortized that over 
40 years instead of four years, the net book value of Grand Canyon would have been 
approximately $862,500 higher in July of 1992 when Marc Smith's stock was redeemed. 
b. As set forth above in paragraph 4, Grand Canyon recorded a value of the 
Whitewater/Sobek assets acquired in the 1991 sale on Grand Canyon's books in an amount 
which is $229,321 less than the $1.2 million purchase price. A copy of Grand Canyon's 
November 30 and December 31, 1991 financial statements are attached to Plaintiffs 
Memorandum as Exhibit "G" and made a part hereof. As part of his consolidation of the 
Whitewater/Sobek financial statement with that of Grand Canyon, Mr. Willis did not enter 
onto the books of Grand Canyon the full purchase price value of $1,200,000. Mr. Willis 
reduced the equity value of the Whitewater/Sobek investment by creating a negative balance 
in the retained earnings of Whitewater/Sobek Investment in the amount of $229,304. This 
negative balance is comprised of four components: (1) Mr. Willis booked the assets at 
$1,170,000 instead of $1,200,000 purchase price creating a difference of $30,000; (2) Mr. 
Willis entered a figure of depreciation in the amount of $59,304 for assets that had been 
acquired approximately one month earlier; (3) a negative cash balance of $26,382 was 
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recorded; and, (4) Mr. Willis recorded prepaid, 1992 trip deposits in the amount of $113,618 
without reflecting a corresponding increase in the cash account. 
I find it remarkable that assets acquired one month prior to consolidation would 
generate a cash loss of $140,450, non-cash depreciation of $59,304 and a reduction in asset 
value for the purchase price of $30,000. Certainly, generally accepted accounting principles 
would allow for the recording of some depreciation for the month of December 1991, but not 
in the substantial amount of $59,304. This aggressive depreciation represents 12.6 percent 
of the entire recorded value of the Whitewater/Sobek physical assets. This level of 
depreciation is inconsistent with generally accepted accounting principles, or may be at best 
on the very high end of what is allowable by generally accepted accounting principles. 
Similarly, Mr. Willis and the officers and directors of Grand Canyon booked a cash loss of 
$140,450 for approximately one month generated by the assets of a non-operating entity, 
when in comparison, Grand Canyon's year to date operating expenses for the month of 
December 1991 increased by only $87,804 as compared with year to date operating expenses 
through November 30,1991. See Exhibit G. Finally, Mr. Willis provides no explanation for 
recording Whitewater/Sobek's assets on the books of Grand Canyon at $30,000 less than the 
purchase price of $1,200,000. 
c. When Whitewater/Sobek assets were acquired by Grand Canyon in 1991, Mr. 
Willis recorded intangible value of the U.S. Forest Service permits at $500,000, the customer 
mailing list at $100,000 and the good will at $100,000. See Exhibit G. While this method 
employed by Mr. Willis of accounting for the intangible assets is closer to being in compliance 
with generally accepted accounting principles from that previously employed by Grand 
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Canyon upon the acquisition of Ron Smith's assets, it still is not without its problems. First, 
Mr. Willis makes no assessment for the fair value of the forest service permits. It appears that 
the permits are the only reason Grand Canyon acquired Whitewater/Sobek's assets. See 
Exhibit F. Second, Mr. Willis' allocation of $100,000 toward a mailing list and $100,000 
toward good will appears to be entirely arbitrary. The allocations do not of themselves affect 
the net book value of Grand Canyon as of July of 1992, but the amortization of these 
intangible assets does. In the seven months from June 30, 1992 back to November of 1991 
when Whitewater/Sobek's assets were acquired, Grand Canyon wrote off $90,000 of the 
intangible value. A copy of Grand Canyon's June 30, 1992 balance sheet and financial 
statement is attached to Plaintiffs Complaint as Exhibit "H" and made a part hereof. 
In my opinion, $90,000 is far in excess of economic reality and is an unreasonable 
application of generally accepted accounting principles. The assets acquired from 
Whitewater/Sobek in November of 1991 would not have reduced their economic value by 
$90,000 in seven months. If anything, they would have increased in value. As a result, in my 
opinion, to conform to generally accepted accounting principles, any amortization of the 
intangibles from the Whitewater/Sobek asset acquisition should be over 40 years. Had Mr. 
Willis amortized the intangible assets over 40 years in accordance with generally accepted 
accounting principles, the appropriate amortization for the seven months from November of 
1991 to June of 1992 would have been $11,250 instead of $90,000. 
d. Based on the financial documents I have reviewed, it appears to have been Mr. 
Willis' and/or Grand Canyon's officers' and directors' policy to expense items that could 
properly have been capitalized under generally accepted accounting principles. For example, 
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legal fees paid by Grand Canyon to defend and renew the forest service permits could have 
been capitalized according to generally accepted accounting principles, which capitalization 
would have increased the net book value dollar for dollar for all such fees incurred. 
e. In my opinion, Grand Canyon adopted an unreasonably conservative 
accounting policy in recognizing pre-paid trip revenue. As of June 30, 1992, there was 
$1,107,059.45 of prepaid trip fees for 1992 trips sitting in a current liability account on the 
books of Grand Canyon. A copy of Grand Canyon's June 30, 1992 financial statement is 
attached to Plaintiff's Memorandum as Exhibit "H" and made a part hereof. In my opinion, 
at a minimum, the prepaid trip revenue should have been recognized to the extent of fixed 
costs already incurred (taking into account historical cancellation rates) plus revenue equal 
to the potential cancellation fees on the prepaid revenue. The reasonable recognition of these 
substantial receipts as income would have substantially increased the net book value as of 
June 30, 1992. 
f. According to generally accepted accounting principles, depreciation expense 
should be recorded according to the matching principle. The cost of acquiring an asset should 
be spread over the time period that the asset participates in the generation of revenue. 
Typically this is done by estimating an asset's useful life and depreciating the asset over its 
useful life. The depreciation taken by Grand Canyon through Mr. Willis and/or its officers 
and directors appears to be unreasonably aggressive given the nature and longevity of the 
assets owned by Grand Canyon, particularly in light of the company's obligations under its 
buy-sell agreement with its shareholders to buy back its shareholders' stock at the net book 
value. The aggressive manipulation of generally accepted accounting principles as applied by 
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Mr. Willis in this case results in an unreasonably reduced net book value available to Marc 
Smith in July of 1992. 
8. Upon review of the Grand Canyon April 1992 pre bookings as reflected on its financial 
statements, as compared to its April 1991 pre bookings, it appears that Grand Canyon's bookings in 
1992 were almost double those of 1991. A copy of Grand Canyon's April 30, 1991 and April 30, 
1992 financial statements is attached hereto as Exhibit "L" and made a part hereof. Further, those 
bookings were substantially higher than any preceding year. Apparently, Grand Canyon was sensitive 
to this potential increase in revenue since it paid off in full its $542,000 long-term note payable to 
Shareholder Don Saunders in June of 1992. A copy of the May 31, 1992 Grand Canyon financial 
statement is attached to Plaintiffs Memorandum as Exhibit "M" and made a part of hereof. See also 
Exhibit H. According to Grand Canyon's financial records, it was on the cusp of a wave of 
substantial increase in its income at the time it terminated Marc Smith in July of 1992. A copy of 
Grand Canyon's July 31, 1992 financial statements attached to Plaintiffs Memorandum as Exhibit 
"N" and made a part hereof. I note that even though Grand Canyon paid Saunders in excess of 
$500,000 cash from its 1992-1993 trip deposits, essentially none of that income had been recognized 
as income by Mr. Willis or the other officers and directors of Grand Canyon by July 1992. 
9. The proper method for accounting for a refund, such as that received by Grand 
Canyon from the state of Arizona related to the entertainment tax, would be to record the receipt of 
the refund as a "prior period adjustment". According to generally accepted accounting principles, 
a "prior period adjustment" is an accounting treatment used when a transaction occurs or an error 
is discovered which does not relate to the period in which it is determined or realized. Generally 
accepted accounting principles require the accountant, in this case Mr. Willis, to record the amount 
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in question directly to equity via a "prior period adjustment". The "prior period adjustment" is shown 
in the equity section of the balance sheet and places the reader of the financial statement on notice 
that the afifect relates to prior periods. It is my opinion that generally accepted accounting principles 
require the consideration of the portion of the Arizona entertainment tax refund that would have been 
in existence in June of 1992 as part of the equity as of June 1992. 
10. Based on my review of the financial records of Grand Canyon, produced to date by 
Defendants including those related to the 1996 Arizona entertainment tax refund, and according to 
a reasonable application of generally accepted accounting principles, the net book value of Grand 
Canyon in June of 1992 should increase by at least $1,750,554. 
DATED this J / day of March, 1999. 
&iom4&*^ 
DERKG MUSSEN 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
MOTAAY PUBLIC 
«J£ACIE WILLIAMS 
Salt UkeCrty.UT 84111 
My Commission Expires 
April 16, 2002 
_ STATE OF UTAH 
3l day of March, 1999. 
i^fan^lIU ArrOg. 
Notary Public 
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STOEL RIVES LLP 
John A. Anderson (#4464) 
Matthew M. Durham (#6214) 
One Utah Center, Suite 1100 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-4904 
Telephone: (801)328-3131 
Attorneys for Defendant 
RECEIVED 
MAR - 2 1999 
STIRBA 4 HATHAWAY 
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF KANE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARC SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO., 
MARTIN MATHIS; MICHAEL 
DENOYER; DONALD SAUNDERS; 
JOHN DOES 1 through 5; and JANE 
DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' ANSWERS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S SECOND SET OF 
INTERROGATORIES 
Civil No. 940600003 
The Honorable K.L. Mclff 
Defendants Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., ("Grand Canyon") Martin Mathis, Michael 
Denoyer, Donald Saunders (sometimes collectively referred to as "Defendants"), hereby 
respond to Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories pursuant to Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. 
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INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Identify the person who informed you Grand 
Canyon Expeditions Co. might be entitled to a refund of the Amusement Tax pursuant to the 
Arizona Supreme Court's ruling in Wilderness World Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 
108 (Ariz. 1995). 
ANSWER: Defendants object to this interrogatory to the extent that it seeks 
information protected by the attorney-client privilege or the attorney work product doctrine. 
Defendants further object to this interrogatory on the grounds that it is overly broad in that the 
Wilderness World case was decided years after the separation of Plaintiff from employment at 
Grand Canyon. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Defendants state that Grand 
Canyon and Michael Denoyer were informed by counsel in Arizona of the Wilderness World 
litigation. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 5: Identify the individual at Grand Canyon 
Expeditions Co. who first received the information referred to in Interrogatory No. 4. 
ANSWER: Michael Denoyer. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 6: State the date(s) Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. 
received a refund of the Amusement Tax pursuant to the Arizona Supreme Court's ruling in 
Wilderness World Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 895 P.2d 108 (Ariz. 1995). 
ANSWER: Defendants object to this interrogatory on the grounds that it is overly 
broad and not reasonably calculated to the discovery of admissible evidence because Grand 
Canyon was unaware of any refund from the State of Arizona until more than three years after 
Plaintiffs separation from employment at Grand Canyon. Subject to and without waiving this 
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objection, Grand Canyon received a refund of $907,916.94 in three payments in late 1995 or 
early 1996. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Identify to whom the refund of the Amusement 
Tax was made payable. 
ANSWER: Defendants object to this interrogatory on the same grounds discussed in 
their answer to Interrogatory No. 6. Subject to and without waiving this objection, Defendants 
state that ail refund payments were made to Grand Canyon. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 8: State the period of time during which the 
Amusement Tax was assessed Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. by the state of Arizona. 
ANSWER: Defendants object to this interrogatory on the same grounds discussed in 
their answer to Interrogatory No. 6. Subject to and without waiving this objection, Defendants 
state that the state of Arizona assessed the Amusement Tax against Grand Canyon from the 
time the company was formed until April 1995. 
INTERROGATORY NO, 9: State how the Amusement Tax refunded Grand 
Canyon Expeditions Co., Mike Denoyer, Martin Matties, Don Saunders, Ron Smith or any 
other individual affiliated with Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. was applied and distributed 
from the date of receipt through the present, and identify where the refund was accounted for 
on Grand Canyon Expeditions Co.'s financial statements and tax returns. 
ANSWER: Defendants object to this interrogatory on the same grounds as discussed 
in their answer to Interrogatory No. 6. Subject to and without waiving this objection, 
Defendants state that Grand Canyon received a total $907,916.94 in three payments from the 
state of Arizona. Of that amount, $280,600.18 was paid to Grand Canyon with the intention 
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that Grand Canyon refund that amount to certain of its former customers. All but 
approximately $44,000 of that amount has been refunded to former Grand Canyon customers. 
The remaining amount refunded to Grand Canyon was treated as corporate income during the 
quarter it was received. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 10. Identify all persons who received distribution of 
any portion of the refunded Amusement Tax and the amount received by each such person. 
ANSWER: Defendants object to this interrogatory on the grounds that it is overly 
broad, unduly burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of 
admissible evidence. Many of the individuals who received refunds were former clients or 
customers of Grand Canyon whose specific identity is not relevant to Plaintiffs claims in this 
actions. Subject to and without waiving these objections, Defendants state that $699,316.76 of 
the amount refunded was received by Grand Canyon. 
INTERROGATORY NO. 11: State the date(s) Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. 
distributed all or a portion of the refunded Amusement Tax to Mike Denoyer, Martin Mathis, 
Don Saunders, Ron Smith, customers of Grand Canyon Expedition Co., and all other affiliates 
of Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. 
ANSWER: Defendants object to this interrogatory on the same grounds discussed in 
their answer to Interrogatory No. 6. Subject to and without waiving this objection, Defendants 
state that certain refund payments were made to former customers of Grand Canyon as 
described in answer to Interrogatory No. 9. Other than those payments, refunds of the 
Amusement Tax were not made, as such, to any individual or entity. Rather, those remaining 
amounts were treated as corporate income for the period in which they were received. 
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Decisions regarding corporate distributions were made based upon a number of factors, only 
one of which was the Amusement Tax refund payment. 
DATED this Ulr~ day of March, 1999. 
STOEL RIVES LLP 
^Richard Sf. Skeen 
John A. Anderson 
Matthew M. Durham 
Attorneys for Defendants 
VERIFICATION 
Michael R. Denoyer, as President of Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., states he 
has read the foregoing Defendants' Answers to Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories to 
Defendants; that the facts contained in the answers were compiled by various employees and 
agents of Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., and no single employee or agent of Grand Canyon 
Expeditions Co. has personal knowledge as to all the facts contained in the answers; that the 
answers are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, and that he 
signs the Defendants' Answers to Plaintiff's Second Set of Interrogatories for and on behalf of 
Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. 
Michael R. Denoyer 
President 
Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. 
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RECEIVED 
JAN 2 1 1999 ' 
Stirba and Hathaway 
DISTRICT COURT, KANE COUNTY, UTAH 
76 North Main 
Kanab, UT 84741 
Telephone: 435-644-2458 Fax: 435-644-2052 
MARC SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO., 
MARTIN MATHIS, MICHAEL DENOYER, 
DONALD SAUNDERS, JOHN DOES 1 
through 5 and JANE DOES 1 through 5, 
Defendants, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 940600003 
Assigned Judge: K. L. Mclff 
Undisputed Pacts 
The defendant, Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., (hereafter the "Company") is a Utah 
corporation organized in November 1986. Its initial assets were acquired from a similarly named 
entity, Grand Canyon Expeditions Inc. The owners of the new Company were five in number: 
The plaintiff Marc Smith, his brother Ronald Smith, founder and owner of the selling company, 
and the three who are now named as individual defendants, Martin Mathis, Michael Denoyer, 
and Donald Saunders. 
Defendant Saunders provided the funds to purchase the assets and form the new 
Company, but retained only 28% of the stock. Ten percent was issued to Ron Smith as part of 
the consideration in the buy-out of the former company. Twenty-eight percent went to Denoyer 
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and 17% each to Mathis and plaintiff. The latter three were required to sign non-recourse notes 
in favor of Saunders for the stock issued to each of them. 
While Denoyer, Mathis and plaintiff did not contribute cash, they apparently brought 
experience and expertise and became the principal operators of the Company. Each was required 
to sign an employment contract. The defendant Denoyer became president, responsible for daily 
operations; the defendant Mathis became vice-president of marketing, and the plaintiff became 
vice-president of operations. The employment agreement of each covered the year 1987 but 
carried the following proviso: "At the request of Expeditions [the Company], this Agreement and 
the Employment Period may be extended by the mutual consent of Employee and Expeditions." 
The employment agreements went on to provide: "Either Employee or Expeditions may 
terminate Employee's employment at any time, with or without cause." 
At the same time the employment agreements were executed, the Company entered into a 
buy-sell agreement with each of its five shareholders. Under its terms, the Company was obliged 
to buy and each respective shareholder was obliged to sell his stock "Upon . . . death, disability 
or termination of employment with the corporation, (either voluntarily or involuntarily). . . ." 
The one-year employment agreements were not formally renewed, but Denoyer as 
president and Mathis and plaintiff as vice-presidents continued as the principal operating officers 
of the company until July 15,1982. On that date, and for reasons that are in dispute, Denoyer 
advised plaintiff that he was being terminated and that the necessary documentation was being 
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prepared to carry out the terms of the buy-sell agreement. Plaintiff immediately tried to reach 
Saunders, who had funded the creation of The Company and to whom plaintiff still owed money 
for issuance of stock to him. When plaintiff reached Saunders two or three days later, Saunders 
stood behind the termination decision and discussed with plaintiff the buy-out provisions. 
Thereafter, plaintiff obtained the termination documents which he had in his possession for a 
matter of days before executing them on July 25, 1992. There were two documents, one a single 
page entitled "Resignation" and a second one labeled "Agreement". The latter made reference to 
the former and then went on to provide in some detail the terms of the buy-out of plaintiffs stock 
as well as other provisions concerning his relationship with the Company. 
Upon execution of the documents, The Company made payment to plaintiff according to 
the terms thereof and continued to do so during the months and years that followed until full 
satisfaction. 
On January 10,1994, some one and one-half years after termination, plaintiff brought the 
within action. It initially named the current defendants along with plaintiffs brother, Ron Smith, 
and his brother's children. It alleged breach of contract, tortuous interference with contract and 
economic relations, wrongful termination, libel and slander, estoppel and claims for punitive as 
well as other damages. In July 1998, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint narrowing the 
relief sought and limiting the defendants to four: The Company, the original financier and major 
owner, Saunders, and the two remaining officers, Denoyer and Mathis. 
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Plaintiffs claims are now limited to two: Breach of an implied in-fact employment 
agreement and breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
Legal Discussion 
In their motion for summary judgment, defendant's raise four arguments. Each will be 
discussed in turn. 
I. 
Defendants initially claim that plaintiff is an "at will" employee by virtue of the express 
language of the employment agreement which covered the year 1987, but which defendants' 
claim was extended by implication as evidenced by the fact that the employment has continued 
uninterrupted. They point to the language that provided for extension at the request of the 
company and the consent of both. Plaintiff counters with the argument that the one-year contract 
has expired by its own terms and therefore has no bearing on the issues. The Court cannot 
embrace either position as a matter of law. The trier of fact may conclude from the evidence and 
permissible inferences that the terms of the written contract were perpetuated with the consent of 
both parties. If such be the case, the employment would be an "at will" arrangement. On the 
other hand, a full airing of the evidence may establish that the relationship evolved into 
something which contemplated greater job security and permanency. 
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II. 
Defendants next argue that even if the written employment agreement was not extended 
and accordingly no longer governs, Utah law raises a presumption of an "at will" employment 
arrangement. Defendants are correct, but this presumption has been softened considerably during 
recent years. The presumption can be overcome by an affirmative showing by the plaintiff that 
the parties expressly or impliedly intended a longer term or that the relationship could be 
terminated only for cause. Berube v. Fashions Center, Ltd., Ill P2.d 1033 (Utah 1989). 
Moreover, as stated in Berube, "[T]he determination of whether sufficient indicia of an implied 
in-fact promise exists is a question of fact for the jury, with the burden of proof resting upon the 
plaintiff-employee." Id, at 1044. The facts in this case have not been developed sufficiently for 
the Court to conclude as a matter of law that plaintiff could not meet this burden. 
III. 
Defendants next argue that even if the relationship had evolved into something other than 
"at will" employment, the Company had just reason to terminate plaintiff for cause. On this 
point, the evidence is clearly in dispute. Defendants point to numerous confrontations and 
incidents in which plaintiffs behavior or practices were considered contrary to the interests of 
the Company. Plaintiff counters with denials and affidavits of other Company employees that 
paint a complimentary portrait of plaintiff. The Court is unable to conclude as a matter of law 
that reasonable minds would arrive at the same conclusion with respect to this issue. 
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IV, 
Finally, defendants advance the position that the parties reached an accord between July 
15 and July 25, 1992 as reflected in the termination documents. With this the Court is essentially 
in agreement. Plaintiffs resignation is short and simple and is signed and notarized. The 
accompanying agreement provides for the purchase of plaintiff s stock at 140% of value, 
consistent with the buy-sell agreement, and affords him two other forms of relief to which he 
does not appear to have been previously entitled. These two benefits are respectively a severance 
payment equivalent to one year's salary and the second, a relaxation of a non-competition 
covenant. 
Under paragraph 6 of the termination agreement, the severance pay was "In addition to 
the payments provided above [for stock purchase], and in lieu of any other amounts or benefits 
which may be due from the corporation as provided in the employment agreement or 
otherwise . . . . " This is strong language. Plaintiffs deposition testimony indicates that it was he 
who raised the possibility of a severance payment with Mr. Saunders. According to plaintiffs 
testimony, Saunders replied, "We could think about it. Give you a year. I'm sure the guys would 
go with that." Plaintiffs deposition volume II at 297. That, of course, is what happened. 
Plaintiff alleges by deposition or affidavit testimony that he was in "shock", that he was 
"coerced" and that he "did not know what he was doing", but he stops short of claiming fraud in 
the inducement or some other legal theory warranting avoidance of the terms agreed upon in 
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writing. By affidavit, he claims that he "did not negotiate," but such seems at least partially 
compromised in light of his testimony regarding the matter of severance pay. 
Plaintiffs deposition testimony also establishes his awareness of the existence of a non-
compete obligation binding upon him at the time of termination. Id. at 125. Under paragraph 9 
of the termination agreement, the Company agreed to waive any right to enforce this provision. 
This is further consideration for plaintiffs compromise of a continued right of employment if 
such existed at that time. 
By way of affidavit, plaintiff seeks to water-down his deposition testimony regarding his 
role in arriving at the termination agreement, but he fails to supply a sufficient explanation for 
the discrepancies and further fails to supply sufficient facts to support a claim for relief from the 
documents signed by him and which governed the termination and buy-out. To the contrary, the 
undisputed evidence is that Plaintiff accepted the agreed-upon payments contemporaneously 
made as well as the payments that were made during the months and years that followed. 
Ruling 
For the reasons set forth, the Court is persuaded that plaintiffs claim of an entitlement to 
continued employment fails as a matter of law. This is true whether premised on a claimed 
breach of an implied in-fact employment agreement or a claimed breach of the duty of good faith 
and fair dealing. There is, however, one other issue which has been raised in a somewhat oblique 
fashion, but has not been resolved to the Court's satisfaction. Plaintiff has alleged that at the 
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time he was obliged to sell his stock, the value thereof was "aberrationally lower" than it had 
been in the two preceding years and only half of what it was reported to be in the following year. 
He further points to a subsequent recovery by the company of a very substantial improperly paid 
tax to the State of Arizona. Defendants' counsel undertook at oral argument to make explanation 
for the variations in stock values as well as the subsequently recovered tax payment. Perhaps 
there are adequate explanations, but at this point it appears that the buy-out of plaintiff s 
ownership interest occurred at the worst possible time for him. Moreover, it appears from the 
deposition testimony to which the Court has had exposure, that plaintiff was not versed in the 
Company's accounting matters and would not have been in a position to evaluate the numbers 
unilaterally supplied. Further, all parties would have been laboring under the erroneous 
assumption that the tax payments were gone forever. 
The duty of good faith and fair dealing applies not only to the original agreements 
between these parties, but would have extended to the termination proceedings and the manner of 
accounting and fixing values. And this is so even though the buy-sell agreement accorded 
"conclusive status" to the values determined by the accountant. The conclusive status of these 
values necessarily presumes the absence of a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 
Conclusion 
Defendants' counsel is directed to prepare a partial summary judgment in conformity with 
this memorandum decision and the rules of the Court. Counsel for both parties are invited to 
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examine the issues remaining with an eye toward resolution or refinement for purposes of further 
proceedings or trial. 
Dated this ( J day of January, 1999. 
On January b 
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EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT dated the Zl day of
 / t 4 e ^ r 
1986, is entered into by and between Marc Smith, (hereinafter 
referred to as "Employee") and Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 
(hereinafter referred to as "Expeditions"). 
I. RECITALS 
A. Expeditions is engaged in the business of promoting 
and running raft trips in the Grand Canyon, Arizona. 
B. It is essential for the full protection of the 
business of Expeditions (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Employer"), and its employees engaged in such businesses, that 
the employees should not disclose confidential or other vital 
information regarding such business with which they have or may 
become acquainted during the period of their employment. Without 
such protection, it would not be practical to expose Employee to 
work being done by Employer and its employees, nor to bring 
Employee into free and open relationships with other employees of 
Employer who are possessed of such proprietary information. 
II. AGREEMENT 
Therefore, it is agreed as follows: 
1. Terms of Employment. Terms of Employment of 
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I Afore Sfrr^ 
Employee by Expeditions, including Employment Period, are as 
follows: 
A. Employment Period, Expeditions agrees to 
employ Employee, and Employee agrees to remain in the 
employ of Expeditions during the period (the "Employment 
Period") beginning on the 1st day of January, 1987, and 
ending on he 31st day of December, 1987. During the 
Employment Period, the Employee shall perform such 
duties for Expeditions as he may be reasonably requested 
to do, relating to its business. At the request of 
Expeditions this Agreement and the Employment Period may 
be extended by the mutual consent of Employee and 
Expeditions. 
B. Performance of Duties. Expeditions and 
Employee agree that during the Employment Period, 
Employee shall devote his business time to the business 
affairs of Expeditions and its affiliated companies. 
Employee's responsibilities to Expeditions and its 
affiliated companies shall be substantially comparable 
to the duties he performed for other companies immedi-
ately prior to the date hereof or as mutually agreed. 
C. Compensation. Subject to the terms and condi-
tions of this Employment Agreement, Employee shall be 
compensated as follows: 
-2-
1. For the 12 consecutive-month period 
commencing on the first day January 1987, 
Employee shall receive, in substantially equal 
monthly or more frequent installments, a basic 
annual salary of $ J^ ccc cj^. ^^ b a si c 
salary payable during any extension of the 
Employment Period shall be by mutual agreement 
of the parties. 
2. Employee shall be entitled to parti-
cipate in a bonus plan to be established and 
to be known as The Grand Canyon Expeditions 
Co. Key Personnel Bonus Plan. Said Plan will 
be based on a percentage of pre federal in-
come tax net profit and substantially in the 
form attached hereto as Attachment A. 
3. Either Employee or Expeditions may 
terminate Employee's employment at any time, 
with or without cause. Expedition's obliga-
tion to pay Employee in accordance with the 
provisions of subparagraph 1 next above shall 
cease as of the date of Employee's termination 
of employment with Expeditions, if such termi-
nation is on account of Employee's death, dis-
ability, voluntary resignation or on account 
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)f his dismissal for cause. If Employee's 
employment with Expeditions terminates for any 
other reason, Expedition's obligation to pay 
Employee in accordance with subparagraph 1 
next above shall continue for the remainder of 
the Employment Period, or, if earlier, until 
the date of his death, as though he were 
employed during that period. 
4. If Employee's employment is termi-
nated on account of Employee's death, disabi-
lity, or dismissal by Expeditions without 
cause, then Employee shall be entitled to 
receive, prorated for the applicable one year 
period based upon the period of employment 
preceding such termination, benefits under 
Attachment A. 
5. Employee shall be entitled to the 
same pension, retirement, medical, insurance, 
customary holidays, and other fringe benefits 
as shall be made available to management em-
ployees of Expeditions. 
2. Non-Competition. During the Employment Period and 
during the two years after the end of the Employment Period, or 
any extensions thereof, Employee shall not: 
-4-
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a. Own (directly or indirectly), work for or 
act as a consultant for, or serve as a director, officer 
or principal of, any business (except for the Employer 
or an affiliated company) which engages (as a major line 
of business) in, or 
b. Intentionally assist any business (except 
for the Employer or an affiliated company) in the estab-
lishment or operation of, the business of promoting and 
running rafting trips in the Grand Canyon, Arizona, 
3. Successors. In the event that Expeditions shall a 
any time be merged or consolidated with or into any other corpo-
ration or corporations or shall sell or otherwise transfer sub-
stantially all of its assets to another corporation, the provi-
sions of this Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the 
benefit of the consolidated Corporation or to the Corporation 
which such assets shall be sold or transferred. 
4. Assigns. Except as provided in the preceding para 
graph, this Agreement may not be assigned by either Expeditions 
or Employee. 
5* Notices. Any notice or communication required by 
or permitted to be given in connection with this Agreement shall 
be in writing and shall be delivered in person, sent by prepaid 
telegram and followed with a confirming letter, or mailed by 
-5-
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certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, and ad-
dressed to Employee at such address as he may rom time to time 
select and to Expeditions at: 
Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. 
P. 0. Box 0 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
6. General Provisions. The following general terms 
and provisions shall apply: 
A. No amendment or modification of this Agreement 
shall be deemed effective unless executed in writing by both 
parties hereto. 
B. No term or condition of this Agreement shall be 
deemed to have been waived, nor shall there be any estoppel to 
enforce any provision of this Agreement, except by written 
instrument executed by the party charged with such waiver or 
estoppel. Any written waiver shall not be deemed a continuing 
waiver unless specifically stated, shall operate only as to the 
specific term or condition waived and shall not constitute a 
waiver of such term or condition for the future or as to any act 
other than that specifically waived. 
C. If any part, term or provision of this Agreement is 
held by the courts to be unenforceable, illegal or in conflict 
with any federal, state or local laws, such part, term or provi-
sion shall be considered severable from the rest of the Agree-
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ment. The remaining portions of the Agreement shall not be af-
fected, and the rights and obligations of the parties shall be 
construed and inferred as if the Agreement did not contain the 
particular term, part or provision held to be invalid, unless the 
invalid provisions, when considered in the aggregate, render the 
administration and intent of this Agreement unreasonably burden-
some or destroy the intent of the parties hereto, in which case 
this Agreement shall be terminated. 
D. The provision against assignment of this Agreement 
shall not preclude the legal representatives of the estate of the 
Employee from assigning any rights hereunder to the person or 
persons entitled thereto under his will or, in the case of intes-
tacy, to the person or persons entitled thereto under the laws of 
intestacy applicable to his estate. 
E. This Agreement constitutes the sole understanding 
of the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof. 
F. Arbitration. Any controversy or claim arising out 
of or relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be 
settled by arbitration in the City of Kanab in accordance with 
the provisions of the American Arbitration Association. 
9. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by 
and construed according to the laws of the State of Utah. 
-7-
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed 
this Agreement as of the date and year first above written. 
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO. 
i t s P/Z/&/0&AS7-
M'ARC SMITH 
EMPLOYEE 
1 8 . 7 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
8UY SELL AGREEMENT 
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO. 
THIS AGREEMENT made this 2 9 t h day of November
 t 
1986, by and between DONALD A. SAUNDERS, RONALD R- SMITH, MICHAEL 
R. DENOYER, MARTIN M. MATHIS and MARC SMITH, (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as "Shareholders") and GRAND CANYON 
EXPEDITIONS CO., a Utah corporation (hereinafter referred to as 
the "Corporation") . 
WHEREAS, the Shareholders will, upon issue, own ail of 
the issued and outstanding shares of the Corporation, and 
WHEREAS, the Shareholders desire to promote their mutual 
interest and the interest of the Corporation by imposing certain 
restrictions and obligations upon themselves, the Corporation and 
on the shares of stock of the Corporation. 
IT IS THEREFORE AGREED: 
1. Purchase of Stock. Upon the death, cisaoility, cr 
termination of employment with the Corporation, (either volun-
tarily or involuntarily), of any Shareholder, the Corporation 
shall purchase and the individual Shareholder, or his estate, 
shall sell, all of that individual's interest in the Corporation 
now owned or hereinafter acquired. The purchase price of the 
stock shall he as set forth in paragraph 2 of this Agreement. 
2. Purchase Price. The purchase price of each share 
of stock will be determined as follows: 
1. The first year, net book value* 
2. The second year, net book value 
times one hundred ten percent 
(110%) • 
3. The third year, net book value 
times one hundred twentv percent 
(120%). 
4. The fourth year, net book value 
times one hundred thirty percent 
(130%) . 
5. The fifth year and beyond, net 
book value times one hundred forty 
percent (140% ) . 
The determination of net book value shall be made by the 
accountant servicing the Corporation and shall be made according 
to generally accepted accounting principles. Any such determina-
tion snail be conclusive on ail parties. 
3. Payment Date. The purchase price shall be paid in 
casn within sixty (60) days after any of the events set forth in 
paragraph 1 and shall be paid as follows: 
A. A down payment equal to thirty 
percent (30%) of the purchase price 
or the total amount of the remaining 
obligation owed by the individual 
Shareholder to Donald A. Saunders 
for the purchase of the stock, 
whichever is greater; 
B. The oalance over six (6) years 
at ten percent (10%) interest. 
-2-
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4. Delivery of Stock, Upon the happening of any of 
the events set forth in paragraph 1, the individual, or his 
estate, snail immediately assign and deliver the shares of that 
Sharenolder to the Corporation. Such shares shall immediately be 
designated as treasury stock on the books and records of the 
Corporation; thereafter, Shareholder, or his estate, shall have 
no further right or interest in the management or operation of 
the Corporation and his sole claim against the Corporation shall 
oe for the payment of the said shares pursuant to the terms of 
this Agreement. 
5. Restrictions on Stock, Mo Sharenolder shall dis-
pose of or encumber any part of his stock in the Corporation 
unless all other Shareholders of the Corporation previously agree 
in writing. Any such attempted sale or encumbrance shall be void 
and shall not be recognized by the Corporation for any purpose. 
6. Sale of Stock. Anytime the Sharenolders of SIXTY 
POUR PERCENT (64%) or more of the outstanding shares of stock in 
the Corporation desire to sell their shares, they shall so notify 
all of the remaining Shareholders in writing. Such writing shall 
set forth the sales price for the shares, any terms of sale, the 
name and address of the proposed purchaser and shall contain a 
representation that the offer to sell is bona fide and has tenta-
tively been accepted by the proposed purchaser. The writing 
shall also contain an offer to the remaining Shareholders to 
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RESIGNATION 
I, MARC SMITH, hereby resign as Vice President/Director 
of Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. , effective the 15th day of July, 
1992. 
DATED this day of r /"<+/ / 1992. 
/Jk&L 
MAR 
Vic, 
iC/ SMITH 
JA P r e s i dent/Director 
STATE OF S3£H /%T'-^<-^ ) 
COUNTY OF <f'*C 
SS. 
thiS J.^ 
, The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me 
r* day of YtJ/f . 1992, by MARC^SMITH. ? 
rlJa KL . <-^> 
NOTARY PUBLIC // »
 ( u 
Residing at: v. A.( A'ft-vt//' / M * : ryfs. 
My Commission Expires: 
g:\wpt\09S\0000Uvrt.WSl 
217 
DEPOSITION 
EXHIBIT J 
PETER STIRB A (Bar No. 3118) 
BENSON L. HATHAWAY, JR. (BarNo. 4138) 
STIRBA & HATHAWAY 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
215 South State Street, Suite 1150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-8300 
m THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
KANE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARC SMITH, 
Plaintiff, 
SECOND AMENDED 
v COMPLAINT 
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS 
CO., DONALD SAUNDERS, 
MICHAEL DENOYER MARTIN 
MATHIS, Civil No. 940600003 
Defendants. Judge Kay McKiff 
Plaintiff, by and through counsel of record, hereby complains against the above-named 
Defendants and alleges for cause of action as follows: 
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PARTIES AND JURISDICTION 
1. Plaintiff Marc Smith is an individual residing in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2. Defendant Grand Canyon Expedition Company, "Grand Canyon", is a Utah 
corporation in good standing with its principal place of business in the city of Kanab, Kane County, 
Utah. 
3. Defendant Donald Saunders, "Saunders", is an individual residing in King County, 
Washington. 
4. Defendant Michael Denoyer, "Denoyer", is an individual residing in Kanab, Kane 
County, Utah. 
5. Defendant Martin Mathis, "Mathis", is an individual residing in Kanab, Kane County, 
Utah. 
6. All of the acts complained of occurred in Salt Lake County and Kane County, Utah. 
7. Defendants Saunders, Denoyer and Mathis are shareholders and directors of 
Defendant Grand Canyon. 
8. Defendant Grand Canyon was incorporated on about November 24, 1986 and is in 
the business of guiding river trips through the Grand Canyon. Defendant Grand Canyon is a 
corporate successor to two corporations known as Ronald R. Smith Co., a Utah corporation, and 
Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc., a Utah corporation. 
9. Witnesses and documentary evidence related to this case are more accessible and 
available within the jurisdiction of this Court than they would be elsewhere. This is the most 
convenient forum for trial of this action. 
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10. Defendant Saunders is subject to the jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-22 et seq. inasmuch as he has transacted business in Kane County, Utah, has caused 
injury in Kane County, Utah, and directly owns property located in Kane County, Utah. 
11. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4 (1997 as 
amended). 
12. Venue is appropriate in this forum pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-13-4 and 7(1953 
as amended). 
BACKGROUND FACTS 
13. Plaintiff incorporates herein paragraphs 1 through 12 above. 
14. Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc., predecessor to Defendant Grand Canyon, was 
incorporated in or about 1964 and commenced doing business conducting guided river trips on the 
Colorado River that same year. 
15. Plaintiff began working for Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc. in or about 1966 and 
became a full-time employee as a river guide and manager in 1973. 
16. Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc. was owned solely by an individual named Ron Smith, 
the Plaintiffs older brother. 
17. Plaintiff remained employed by Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc. until it sold its assets 
and business to Defendant Grand Canyon in November of 1986. 
18. During the 13 years of Plaintiff s full-time employment at Grand Canyon Expeditions, 
Inc., he had gone from a guide running the river trips to managing all of the operations of Grand 
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Canyon Expeditions, Inc.'s business. Plaintiff never received any stock or participated in the equity 
in any way of Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc. prior to November of 1986. 
19. Some time prior to November of 1986, Plaintiffs older brother Ron Smith entered 
into negotiations for the sale of Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc.'s assets to an entity controlled by 
Defendant Saunders. 
20. In the course of the sale of the assets of Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc. to the 
Saunders-controlled entity, Defendant Grand Canyon was formed and incorporated, which entity 
acquired all of the assets of the pre-existing business known as Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc. 
including all park service river permits held by Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc. and other entities. 
21. While conducting his due diligence prior to acquiring the assets of Grand Canyon 
Expeditions, Inc., Defendant Saunders observed, among other things, Plaintiffs role in the operation 
of Grand Canyon Expeditions, Inc.'s business. 
22. Based on these observations, Defendant Saunders offered Plaintiff employment with 
Defendant Grand Canyon and offered Plaintiff the opportunity to purchase a 17 percent interest in 
the equity of Defendant Grand Canyon for the sum of $42,500.00. 
23. Plaintiff was also advised by Saunders that Defendants Denoyer and Mathis would 
assume management positions in Defendant Grand Canyon. 
24. Upon receiving this offer, Plaintiff discussed with Defendants Saunders, Denoyer and 
Mathis the fact that with Denoyer, Mathis and Plaintiff involved in management responsibilities at the 
company, such a management team would make the company top heavy. 
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25. Defendant Saunders assured Plaintiff that Defendant Grand Canyon would soon make 
further acquisitions of other river mnning operations which would make necessary the management 
team proposed by Defendant Saunders. 
26. Defendant Saunders also proposed to loan Plaintiff $42,500.00 to purchase the stock 
offered Plaintiff by Defendant Grand Canyon. 
27. Defendants Saunders, Denoyer and Mathis also represented to Plaintiff that the 
employment commitment and the Plaintiffs equity participation in Defendant Grand Canyon would 
be long term. 
28. Based upon these and other representations, Plaintiff agreed to be employed by 
Defendant Grand Canyon in essentially the same position he had maintained prior to Defendant Grand 
Canyon's acquisition of the business, and accepted the offer to purchase 17 percent of the equity of 
Grand Canyon for $42,500.00. To facilitate this purchase, Plaintiff signed a promissory note to 
Defendant Saunders in that amount. 
29. On November 29, 1986, Plaintiff executed a document styled "Employment 
Agreement". A copy of the Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and made a part hereof. 
30. The November 29, 1986 Employment Agreement was for a specific term of 1 year 
commencing January 1, 1987 and ending December 31, 1987. See Exhibit "A", ^ II. 1.A. 
31. While the employment period set forth in the November 29, 1986 Agreement was 
never extended, renewed or amended in writing, Plaintiffs employment continued after December 
31, 1987 without break until about July 15, 1992. 
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32. On about November 29, 1986, Plaintiff also executed a document styled "Buy-Sell 
Agreement - Grand Canyon Expeditions Co.", referred to hereinafter as "Buy-Sell Agreement", 
between he and Defendants Saunders, Denoyer, Mathis and Plaintiffs older brother Ronald R. Smith. 
A copy of the Buy-Sell Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit UB" and made a part hereof. 
33. Among other things, the Buy-Sell Agreement provided a mechanism whereby the 
purchase price of the stock of the participating shareholders would be acquired by either the 
corporation or other shareholders, and provided that upon the termination of employment with the 
corporation, (either voluntarily or involuntarily), of any shareholder, the corporation shall purchase 
the individual shareholders]" stock. See Exhibit "B", 1f 1 and 2. 
34. By the time the acquisition by Defendant Grand Canyon of the predecessor corporate 
entities' assets had closed, Defendant Saunders owned 28 percent of the stock of Defendant Grand 
Canyon, Defendant Denoyer owned 28 percent, Defendant Mathis owned 17 percent, Plaintiff owned 
17 percent, and Plaintiffs older brother Ron Smith owned 10 percent. 
3 5. Defendant Denoyer was made the president of Defendant Grand Canyon, Defendant 
Mathis was made a vice president and Plaintiff was made a vice president for purposes of the 
operation of the business of Defendant Grand Canyon. 
36. From virtually the outset of their management of the operations of Defendant Grand 
Canyon in late November, early December of 1986, it was the Defendants Saunders, Denoyer and 
Mathis' intention to learn all they could from the work performed by Plaintiff in the management of 
the operations of the business, and once Defendants were comfortable with managing the operations 
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of the business, they designed to terminate PlaintiflTs involvement as an employee and shareholder 
in the enterprise. 
37. This intention was never explained or in any way made known to Plaintiff prior to, 
during, or at anytime after the execution of his Employment Agreement and the Buy-Sell Agreement 
in November of 1986. 
38. Commencing in December of 1986 and continuing thereafter, Defendant Grand 
Canyon operated in much the same manner its corporate predecessors had been operated and 
generated a profit in every succeeding year. 
39. In or about September of 1991, Defendant Grand Canyon acquired the assets of one 
of its competitors operating on the Colorado River and in the Grand Canyon, Sobek/White Water, 
Inc. 
40. It was anticipated that the Sobek/White Water, Inc. acquisition would increase 
Defendant Grand Canyon's earning potential by approximately 50 percent, and substantially enhance 
the Plaintiff and Defendants' equity holdings, which anticipation was figured by Defendant Don 
Saunders and represented to Plaintiff. 
41. In connection with this acquisition, Plaintiff, together with Defendants Saunders, 
Denoyer and Mathis were allowed to purchase additional shares of Defendant Grand Canyon. 
Plaintiff agreed to purchase an additional seven-tenths of one percent (.7%) of the common shares 
of Defendant Grand Canyon for $23,000.00, increasing its equity participation to 17.7 percent. 
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42. Defendant Saunders loaned Plaintiff $23,000.00 to pay Defendant Grand Canyon the 
purchase price of this stock. Defendants Saunders, Denoyer and Mathis also acquired additional 
shares of Defendant Grand Canyon at or about the same time. 
43. On about July 15, 1992, without any prior notice, warning, or intimation, Defendant 
Denoyer as president of Defendant Grand Canyon discharged Plaintiff as an employee of the 
corporation. 
44. Upon his termination, Plaintiff resigned as vice president/director of Defendant Grand 
Canyon as of July 15, 1992. 
45. Defendants provided Plaintiff severance pay totaling one year's salary, and, citing 
Plaintiffs termination of employment as its sole cause and basis for doing so, Defendant Grand 
Canyon exercised the option to purchase Plaintiffs 17.7 percent equity interest in common shares of 
Defendant Grand Canyon according to the terms of the Buy-Sell Agreement, for the gross amount 
of $180,000.00. 
46. The decision to terminate Plaintiffs employment was made by Defendants Saunders, 
Denoyer and Mathis, individually and as officers and directors of Defendant Grand Canyon without 
prior consultation with or prior notice or warning to Plaintiff 
47. In determining the purchase price to be paid for Plaintiffs stock, according to the 
terms of the Buy-Sell Agreement, Defendant Grand Canyon relied on the "net book value" which, 
as a consequence of the Sobek/White Water, Inc. acquisition, on July 15, 1992, was substantially 
lower and subject to liabilities unique and non-existent at any other point in time on the books and 
records of Defendant Grand Canyon. 
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48. The fact that Defendant Grand Canyon had recently acquired Sobek/White Water, 
Inc.' s assets and had incurred substantial liabilities for purposes of that acquisition severely diminished 
the "net book value" of Defendant Grand Canyon in July of 1992. 
49. In about October of 1992, less than three months after Plaintiff had been terminated 
and Defendant Grand Canyon had acquired his stock, Defendant Grand Canyon, by and through its 
directors, Defendants Saunders, Denoyer and Mathis declared a dividend of approximately 
$300,000.00. 
50. Based on Plaintiff s equity interest in Defendant Grand Canyon prior to his termination 
and the acquisition of his stock, his proportional share of the dividend declared in October of 1992, 
would have been approximately $52,500.00. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Contract Against Defendants Saunders, Denoyer, Mathis and Grand Canyon) 
51. Plaintiff incorporates herein paragraphs 1 through 50 above. 
52. The representations of Defendant Saunders, the person who was ultimately in control 
of Defendant Grand Canyon, made in or about November of 1986 and continuing thereafter that 
Plaintiff would be a valued, permanent employee of Defendant Grand Canyon, coupled with his offer 
to Plaintiff of approximately 17.7 percent equity interest in that corporation and his agreement to fund 
Plaintiffs purchase of that interest, and his continued assurances of the long-term viability of the 
business, created his and Defendant Grand Canyon's continuing agreement, supported by adequate 
consideration, to provide employment and equity participation to Plaintiff in perpetuity, barring good 
cause to the contrary. 
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53. The participation of Defendants Denoyer and Mathis in the representations of 
Defendant Saunders, and their individual supportive representations and actions as officers and 
directors of Defendant Grand Canyon created their individual agreements, and created an agreement 
on behalf of Defendant Grand Canyon, supported by adequate consideration, for the continued 
employment of PlaintifFby Defendant Grand Canyon and the continuation of PlaintifFs 17.7 percent 
equity interest in the corporation, as PlaintifFs individual property in perpetuity, barring good cause 
to the contrary. 
54. These representations and actions of Defendants Saunders, Denoyer and Mathis, 
coupled with the course of dealing commencing in November of 1986 and continuing through July 
of 1992, as the controlling shareholders and directors of Defendant Grand Canyon, created a binding 
and on-going contract between Grand Canyon and Plaintiff pursuant to which Grand Canyon was 
obligated to maintain its employment of Plaintiff, and allow him to persist in his ownership of 17.7 
percent equity in that corporation in perpetuity, barring good cause to the contrary. 
55. Defendants Grand Canyon, Saunders, Denoyer and Mathis have breached their 
continuing contracts with PlaintifFby, among other things, using their positions of control to force 
the corporation to wrongfully terminate PlaintifFs employment without cause, prior notice or 
warning, and, consequently, forcing the acquisition by Defendant Grand Canyon of PlaintifFs stock 
pursuant to the Buy-Sell Agreement, at a time when the "net book value" was aberrationally low, 
depriving Plaintiff of the economic benefit and potential for growth thereof 
56. As a direct consequence of the breaches referenced herein, and others, Plaintiff has 
been damaged in an amount to be shown at trial including, but not limited to, the loss and potential 
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for growth in participation in the business of Defendant Grand Canyon, the difference in value paid 
for Plaintiffs stock in light of the aberrationaily low "net book value", together with the value of 
Plaintiffs employment and benefits with Grand Canyon until a reasonable age of retirement. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment below. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
(Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) 
57. Plaintiff incorporates herein paragraphs 1 through 56 above. 
58. At all times material hereto, Plaintiff was a dutiful employee of Defendant Grand 
Canyon who more than fiilly and completely satisfied all of his employment obligations to the 
Defendant Grand Canyon and who contributed to the smooth operation, success and profitability of 
the Defendant Grand Canyon. 
59. Neither Grand Canyon nor any of the Defendants ever complained to Plaintiff in 
writing, orally or otherwise that he was derelict in the performance of his responsibilities, that he was 
not contributing to the operations, success and profitability of the Defendant Grand Canyon's 
business or in any way was not satisfying his employment obligations to the Defendant Grand 
Canyon. 
60. Plaintiff s Employment Agreement with Grand Canyon imposed on Grand Canyon and 
its agents a covenant or duty of good faith and fair dealing in its relationship and in the performance 
of its contractual obligations to Plaintiff. 
61. Similarly, the Buy-Sell Agreement by and between Plaintiff and Defendants imposes 
on all the Defendants a covenant or duty of good faith and fair dealing in making provision for the 
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acquisition by the Company or other shareholders of Plaintiff s stock triggered by the termination of 
Plaintiffs employment. 
62. Defendants breached their covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in Plaintiff s 
employment agreement by terminating him without cause and without prior notice or warning in 
accordance with their designs on July 15, 1992. 
63. Defendants breached their covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in Plaintiff s 
Employment Agreement by not disclosing to him in November of 1986 that it was their intention to 
learn all they could from the operation of the business of Defendant Grand Canyon, and at such time 
as Defendants felt comfortable operating the business on their own, to terminate Plaintiff. 
64. Defendants further breached their covenant of good faith and fair dealing inherent in 
the Buy-Sell Agreement by effectuating their desigr ^ing the Plaintiff on July 15, 1992 at 
a point in time when the "net book value" of T iiyon was aberrationally low as a 
consequence of the Sobek/White Water. J by effectively depriving Plaintiff of 
participating in the anticipated annu 992 and the consequential dividend of 
$300,000.00. 
65. As a direct, foreseeable and contemplated consequence of the Defendants' breach of 
their covenant of good faith and fair dealing to Plaintiff, Plaintiff has sustained general and 
consequential damages in an amount to be shown at trial. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment below. 
JURY DEMAND 
Plaintiff hereby respectfully requests this matter be tried to a jury. 
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WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against the Defendants as follows: 
1. Against the Defendants Grand Canyon, Saunders, Denoyer and Mathis and each of 
them, jointly and severally, shown at trial; in an amount to compensate Plaintiff for the difference in 
value of his stock in July, 1992 and its value had it been sold calculating "net book value" not 
including the Sobek/White Water, Inc. Acquisition debt, plus the value of Plaintiff s continued 
employment at Grand Canyon until retirement plus benefits, together with the PlaintifFs portion of 
the 1992 annual dividend; and, 
2. Against Defendants Grand Canyon, Saunders, Denoyer, Mathis, and each of them 
jointly and severally to compensate Plaintiff for sustaining general and consequential damages on 
Plaintiffs Second Cause of Action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and, 
3. Punitive damages shown at trial against all the Defendants for their breaches of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the wrongful termination of Plaintiff and forced 
the sale of his stock in July of 1992; and, 
4. Costs and attorney's fees incurred herein; and, 
5. Any other relief the Court deems just. 
DATED this '7^1 day of June, 1998. 
STIRB A & HATHAWAY 
PETER STIRBA 
BENSON L. HATHAWAY^ JR. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this -Q^kday of June, 1998,1 caused to be served a true copy 
of the foregoing SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT, by the method indicated below, to the 
following: 
John A. Anderson J^LU.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & ( ) Hand Delivered 
MCCARTHY ( ) Overnight Mail 
Attorneys for Defendants ( ) Facsimile 
50 South Main, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Ut 84145 
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BUY SELL AGREEMENT 
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO. 
THIS AGREEMENT made this 2 9 t h day of November
 # 
1986, by and between DONALD A. SAUNDERS, RONALD R. SMITH, MICHAEL 
R. DENOYER, MARTIN M. MATHIS and MARC SMITH, (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as "Shareholders") and GRAND CANYON 
EXPEDITIONS CO., a Utah corporation (hereinafter referred to as 
the "Corporation"). 
WHEREAS, the Shareholders will, upon issue, own all of 
the issued and outstanding shares of the Corporation, and 
WHEREAS, the Shareholders desire to promote their mutual 
interest and the interest of the Corporation by imposing certain 
restrictions and obligations upon themselves, the Corporation and 
on the shares of stock of the Corporation. 
IT IS THEREFORE AGREED: 
1. Purchase of Stock. Upon the death, disability, or 
termination of employment with the Corporation, (either volun-
tarily or involuntarily), of any Shareholder, the Corporation 
shall purchase and the individual Shareholder, or his estate, 
shall sell, all of that individual's interest in the Corporation 
now owned or hereinafter acquired. The purchase price of the 
stock shall be as set forth in paragraph 2 of this Agreement. 
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2. Purchase Price. The purchase price of each share 
of stock will be determined as follows: 
1. The first year, net book value. 
2. The second year, net book value 
times one hundred ten percent 
(110%). 
3. The third year, net book value 
times one hundred twenty percent 
(120%). 
4. The fourth year, net book value 
times one hundred thirty percent 
(130%). 
5. The fifth year and beyond, net 
book value times one hundred forty 
percent ( 140% ) . 
The determination of net book value shall be made by the -
accountant servicing the Corporation and shall be made according 
to generally accepted accounting principles. Any such determina-
tion shall be conclusive on all parties. 
3. Payment Date. The purchase price shall be paid in 
cash within sixty (60) days after any of the events set forth in 
paragraph 1 and shall be paid as follows: 
A. A down payment equal to thirty 
percent (30%) of the purchase price 
or the total amount of the remaining 
obligation owed by the individual 
Shareholder to Donald A. Saunders 
for the purchase of the stock, 
whichever is greater; 
B. The balance over six (6) years 
at ten percent (10%) interest. 
197 
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4. Delivery of Stock. Upon the happening of any of 
the events set forth in paragraph 1, the individual, or his 
estate, shall immediately assign and deliver the shares of that 
Shareholder to the Corporation. Such shares shall immediately be 
designated as treasury stock on the books and records of the 
Corporation; thereafter, Shareholder, or his estate, shall have 
no further right or interest in the management or operation of 
the Corporation and his sole claim against the Corporation shall 
be for the payment of the said shares pursuant to the terms of 
this Agreement, 
5. Restrictions on Stock. No Shareholder shall dis-
pose of or encumber any part of his stock in the Corporation 
unless all other Shareholders of the Corporation previously agree 
in writing. Any such attempted sale or encumbrance shall be void 
and shall not be recognized by the Corporation for any purpose. 
6. Sale of Stock. Anytime the Shareholders of SIXTY 
FOUR PERCENT (64%) or more of the outstanding shares of stock in 
the Corporation desire to sell their shares, they shall so notify 
all of the remaining Shareholders in writing. Such writing shall 
set forth the sales price for the shares, any terms of sale, the 
name and address of the proposed purchaser and shall contain a 
representation that the offer to sell is bona fide and has tenta-
tively been accepted by the proposed purchaser. The writing 
shall also contain an offer to the remaining Shareholders to 
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8. Term* This Agreement shall terminate upon the 
occurrence of any of the following events: 
A. Cessation of the Corporation's 
business; 
B. Bankruptcy, receivership or 
dissolution of the Corporation; 
C. Whenever there is only one (1) 
surviving Shareholder bound by the 
terms hereof; 
D. The voluntary agreement of all 
parties who are bound by the terms 
of this Agreement. 
E. The sale of ONE HUNDRED PERCENT 
(100%) of the shares of the 
Corporat ion. 
Upon the termination of this Agreement, each Shareholder 
shall surrender to the Corporation, certificates for his stock, 
the Corporation shall issue to him in lieu thereof new certifi-
cates for an equal number of shares without the endorsement set 
forth in paragraph 6. 
9. Exclusions* Donald A. Saunders and Ronald R. Smith 
shall be exempt from the requirement of employment set forth in 
paragraph 1 and the failure of either or both, to be employed by 
the Corporation shall not require them to sell, nor the 
Corporation to purchase, their shares of stock. 
^
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 Benefit. This Agreement shall be binding upon the 
Shareholders, their heirs, legal representatives, successors or 
assigns and upon the Corporation, its successors or assigns. The 
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sell, for a period of not less than SIX (6) months, the subject 
shares upon the same terms and conditions offered to the pro-
spective purchase. If the remaining Shareholders do not accept 
the offer to sell within the SIX (6) month period, all of the 
Shareholders shall immediately thereafter sell all of their 
shares in the corporation to the proposed purchasers upon the 
terms and conditions at the price set forth in the notice. If 
the sale to the proposed purchaser has not closed within NINE (9) 
months from the date of the notice of intent to sell, such offer 
to sell shall lapse and any sale thereafter must comply anew with 
the provisions of this paragraph, 
7, Endorsement on Stock Certificates, Upon the 
execution of this Agreement the Certificates of Stock subject 
hereto shall be endorsed as follows: 
"This certificate is transferable 
only upon compliance with the 
provisions of an Agreement dated the 
29th day of November, 1986, among 
DONALD A. SAUNDERS, RONALD R. SMITH, 
MICHAEL R. DENOYERf MARTIN M, 
MATHIS, MARC SMITH and GRAND CANYON 
EXPEDITIONS CO,, a copy of which is 
on file in the office of the 
Secretary of the Corporation," 
After endorsement the certificate shall be issued to the 
Shareholder, who shall, subject to the terms of this Agreement, 
be entitled to exercise all rights of ownership in such stock. 
All stock hereinafter issued by the Company shall bear a similar 
endorsement. 
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executor, administrator or personal representative of a deceased 
Shareholder shall execute and deliver any and all documents or 
legal instruments necessary to carry out the provisions of this 
Agreement. 
11. Miscellaneous* This Agreement shall be governed by 
the laws of the State of Utah, 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed 
this Agreement the day and year first above written. 
By 
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO-
/xtddi?. 4 * ^ pas**** 
MICHAEL R. DENOYER,*'Pr Iesident 
ATTEST: 
/MLO #J). 
MICHAEL R. DENOYER' 
4**&. f[ARC S _^2_ i^ONALD R. SMITH 
1 8 . 1 1 
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EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT dated the 2-f ' d aY of t]/^/e,^J^.r 
1986f is entered into by and between Marc Smith, (hereinafter 
referred to as "Employee") and Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 
(hereinafter referred to as "Expeditions"). 
I. RECITALS 
A. Expeditions is engaged in the business of promoting 
and running raft trips in the Grand Canyon, Arizona. 
B. It is essential for the full protection of the 
business of Expeditions (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Employer"), and its employees engaged in such businesses, that 
the employees should not disclose confidential or other vital 
information regarding such business with which they have or may 
become acquainted during the period of their employment. Without 
such protection, it would not be practical to expose Employee to 
work being done by Employer and its employees, nor to bring 
Employee into free and open relationships with other employees of 
Employer who are possessed of such proprietary information, 
II. AGREEMENT 
Therefore, it is agreed as follows: 
1. Terms of Employment. Terms of Employment of 
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Employee by Expeditions, including Employment Period, are as 
follows: 
A
* Employment Period. Expeditions agrees to 
employ Employee, and Employee agrees to remain in the 
employ of Expeditions during the period (the "Employment 
Period") beginning on the 1st day of January, 1987, and 
ending on he 31st day of December, 1987. During the 
Employment Period, the Employee shall perform such 
duties for Expeditions as he may be reasonably requested 
to do, relating to its business. At the request of 
Expeditions this Agreement and the Employment Period may 
be extended by the mutual consent of Employee and 
Expeditions. 
B. Performance of Duties. Expeditions and 
Employee agree that during the Employment Period, 
Employee shall devote his business time to the business 
affairs of Expeditions and its affiliated companies. 
Employee's responsibilities to Expeditions and its 
affiliated companies shall be substantially comparable 
to the duties he performed for other companies immedi-
ately prior to the date hereof or as mutually agreed. 
C. Compensat ion. Subject to the terms and condi-
tions of this Employment Agreement, Employee shall be 
compensated as follows: 
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1. For the 12 consecutive-month period 
commencing on the first day January 1987, 
Employee shall receive, in substantially equal 
monthly or more frequent installments, a basic 
annual salary of $ ZhGCC ^ The basic 
salary payable during any extension of the 
Employment Period shall be by mutual agreement 
of the parties. 
2. Employee shall be entitled to parti-
cipate in a bonus plan to be established and 
to be known as The Grand Canyon Expeditions 
Co. Key Personnel Bonus Plan. Said Plan will 
be based on a percentage of pre federal in-
come tax net profit and substantially in the 
form attached hereto as Attachment A. 
3. Either Employee or Expeditions may 
terminate Employee*s employment at any time, 
with or without cause. Expedition's obliga-
tion to pay Employee in accordance with the 
provisions of subparagraph 1 next above shall 
cease as of the date of Employee's termination 
of employment with Expeditions, if such termi-
nation is on account of Employee's death, dis-
ability, voluntary resignation or on account 
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of his dismissal for cause. If Employee's 
employment with Expeditions terminates for any 
other reason, Expedition's obligation to pay 
Employee in accordance with subparagraph 1 
next above shall continue for the remainder of 
the Employment Period, or, if earlier, until 
the date of his death, as though he were 
employed during that period, 
4. If Employee's employment is termi-
nated on account of Employee's death, disabi-
lity, or dismissal by Expeditions without 
cause, then Employee shall be entitled to 
receive, prorated for the applicable one year 
period based upon the period of employment 
preceding such termination, benefits under 
Attachment A. 
5- Employee shall be entitled to the 
same pension, retirement, medical, insurance, 
customary holidays, and other fringe benefits 
as shall be made available to management em-
ployees of Expeditions. 
2. Non-Compet it ion. During the Employment Period and 
during the two years after the end of the Employment Period, or 
any extensions thereof, Employee shall not: 
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a. Own (directly or indirectly)
 f work for or 
act as a consultant for, or serve as a director, officer 
or principal of, any business (except for the Employer 
or an affiliated company) which engages (as a major line 
of business) in, or 
b. Intentionally assist any business (except 
for the Employer or an affiliated company) in the estab-
lishment or operation of, the business of promoting and 
running rafting trips in the Grand Canyon, Arizona, 
3- Successors. In the event that Expeditions shall at 
any time be merged or consolidated with or into any other corpo-
ration or corporations or shall sell or otherwise transfer sub-
stantially all of its assets to another corporation, the provi-
sions of this Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the 
benefit of the consolidated Corporation or to the Corporation 
which such assets shall be sold or transferred, 
4. Ass igns. Except as provided in the preceding para-
graph, this Agreement may not be assigned by either Expeditions 
or Employee, 
5# Notices, Any notice or communication required by 
or permitted to be given in connection with this Agreement shall 
be in writing and shall be delivered in person, sent by prepaid 
telegram and followed with a confirming letter, or mailed by 
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certified or registered mail, return receipt requested, and ad-
dressed to Employee at such address as he may rom time to time 
select and to Expeditions at: 
Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. 
P. 0. Box 0 
Kanab, Utah 84741 
6. General Provisions. The following general terms 
and provisions shall apply: 
A. No amendment or modification of this Agreement 
shall be deemed effective unless executed in writing by both 
parties hereto. 
B. No term or condition of this Agreement shall be 
deemed to have been waived, nor shall there be any estoppel to 
enforce any provision of this Agreement, except by written 
instrument executed by the party charged with such waiver or 
estoppel. Any written waiver shall not be deemed a continuing 
waiver unless specifically stated, shall operate only as to the 
specific term or condition waived and shall not constitute a 
waiver of such term or condition for the future or as to any act 
other than that specifically waived. 
C. If any part, term or provision of this Agreement is 
held by the courts to be unenforceable, illegal or in conflict 
with any federal, state or local laws, such part, term or provi-
sion shall be considered severable from the rest of the Agree-
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ment. The remaining portions of the Agreement shall not be af-
fected, and the rights and obligations of the parties shall be 
construed and inferred as if the Agreement did not contain the 
particular term, part or provision held to be invalid, unless the 
invalid provisions, when considered in the aggregate, render the 
administration and intent of this Agreement unreasonably burden-
some or destroy the intent of the parties hereto, in which case 
this Agreement shall be terminated. 
D. The provision against assignment of this Agreement 
shall not preclude the legal representatives of the estate of the 
Employee from assigning any rights hereunder to the person or 
persons entitled thereto under his will or, in the case of intes-
tacy, to the person or persons entitled thereto under the laws of 
intestacy applicable to his estate. 
E. This Agreement constitutes the sole understanding 
of the parties with respect to the subject matter hereof. 
F. Arbitrat ion. Any controversy or claim arising out 
of or relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof, shall be 
settled by arbitration in the City of Kanab in accordance with 
the provisions of the American Arbitration Association. 
9. Governing Law. This Agreement shall be governed by 
and construed according to the laws of the State of Utah. 
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed 
this Agreement as of the date and year first above written. 
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO. 
1 8 . 7 
BY /fajLrf 7? SyfA^ 
Its /?j?£?/0&A^t-
ui 
MARC SMITH 
EMPLOYEE 
• 8 -
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ATTACHMENT "A" 
GRAND CANYON EXPEDITIONS CO. 
KEY PERSONNEL BONUS PLAN 
!• Purpose, Grand Canyon Expeditions Co. (hereinafter 
referred to as the "Company") has established The Grand Canyon 
Expeditions Co., Key Personnel Bonus Plan as set forth herein 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Plan") to aid the Company in 
attracting, rewarding and retaining well-qualified key personnel 
and to further the identity of interests of such personnel with 
the interests of the Company's shareholder. 
2. Admin istrat ion. The authority to manage and 
control the operation and administration of the Plan, the power 
to grant Annual Incentive Awards (as described in paragraph 4), 
the authority to establish terms, conditions and limitations on 
Annual Incentive Awards and the authority to determine whether 
Performance Targets (as described in paragraph 4) have been met 
shall be vested in the Company's Board of Directors (hereinafter 
referred to as the "Board"). The Board shall act by a majority 
of its then members by meeting or by a writing filed without 
meeting. Any interpretation of the Plan and any decision on any 
other matter within the discretion of the Board made by the Board 
in good faith is final and binding on all persons. No member of 
the Board shall be liable for any action or determination made in 
good faith with respect to the Plan. 
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3« Participation,. The Board shall designate the key 
employees of the Company who shall be eligible to receive Annual 
Incentive Awards for any calendar year (hereinafter referred to 
as the "Participants"). 
4. Annual Incentive Awards. Commencing with the year 
ending the 31st day of December, 1987, and ending in the year 
that the debt of Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., to Ronald Smith 
and Donald A. Saunders is paid in full, a bonus pool of twenty-
two percent (22%) of the pre federal tax income of the Company 
will be divided between key personnel as directed by the Board. 
After the payment of the debt to Ronald Smith and Donald A. 
Saunders the percent shall be increased to thirty-five percent 
(35%). 
5. Termination of Employment. If a Participant's 
employment is terminated by the Company without cause or is 
terminated by reason of death or disability, the Participant or, 
in the event of death, his estate, shall be entitled to a portion 
of the bonus which he would otherwise have received for the year 
in which such termination occurs, pro rated according to the 
portion of the calendar year which elapsed prior to the 
termination of employment. The Board shall make such equitable 
adjustments as it deems appropriate with respect to individual 
Performance Targets for a Participant whose employment is so 
terminated. Such portion shall be paid at the time that the 
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Participant would have received the bonus, if his employment had 
not terminated. Except as provided above in this paragraph 5, or 
as otherwise provided by the Board, no bonus shall be payable for 
any year to a Participant whose employment terminates prior to 
the end of that year. 
6. Withholding of Taxes. Payment of any Incentive 
Award in accordance with the terms of the award shall be subject 
to the withholding of all applicable federal and states taxes. 
7. Interests Not Transferable. Except for amounts, if 
any, owing to Expeitions, the interest of Participants under the 
Plan are not subject to the claims of their respective creditors, 
if any, and may not be voluntarily or involuntarily assigned, 
alienated or encumbered. 
8. Amendment and Termination. The Company reserves 
the right to amend or terminate the Plan at any time by 
resolution of the Board. 
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